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MAKING PLAINTIFFS WHOLE:  A TAX PROBLEM 
OF INTEREST 
WILLIAM E. FOSTER∗ 
Abstract 
This article illustrates the dramatic tax impact of interest awards in 
otherwise non-taxable litigation recoveries and proposes two alternative 
legislative solutions for the over-taxing of plaintiffs in these cases.  While 
plaintiffs who recover personal injury awards typically receive favorable 
tax treatment, those who receive interest on such awards are taxed on the 
interest and often are not able to utilize deductions for attorney’s fees and 
other costs paid to obtain the award.  Further, the attorney’s portion of 
the recovery in a contingency fee arrangement will be included in the 
plaintiff’s gross income.  The result is that the plaintiff recovers less of 
the interest than the Treasury or her attorney, preventing the plaintiff 
from truly being made whole.  After reviewing the historical and 
theoretical framework that produces these results, I suggest previously 
proposed judicial solutions to the problem are impracticable and a 
legislative solution is necessary.  I conclude with a proposal for two 
alternative legislative solutions: an expanded deduction and an exclusion 
to provide relief for plaintiffs recovering partially taxable awards and to 
achieve the policy of fully compensating injured plaintiffs.   
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Introduction 
Ever since the sinking of the Lusitania, taxpayers and courts have 
struggled with the proper tax treatment of interest added to otherwise non-
taxable litigation awards.1  Today, non-taxable compensatory awards and 
settlement payments (such as for personal injury damages)2 are often 
                                                                                                                 
 1. In Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933), the taxpayer recovered, among 
other amounts, $15,000.00 from the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and 
Germany, as a result of personal injuries suffered during the sinking of the steamship 
Lusitania in 1915.  Id. at 1339-40.  In addition to the personal injury damages, the taxpayer 
received $3,422.61 of interest on the recovery.  Id. at 1341.  The personal injury damages 
were excluded from gross income under section 22(a)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1928, but the 
taxpayer and the Treasury disagreed about the taxability of the interest received.  The Board 
of Tax Appeals concluded that the interest award was indeed a separate item from the 
excluded damages award, and was itself taxable absent a separate exclusion.  Id. at 1340-41.  
Perhaps ironically, it was the sinking of the Lusitania that accelerated the United States’ 
entry into World War I, the funding of which required the first significant expansion of the 
applicability of the modern federal individual income tax.  See generally ROBERT M. 
WILLAN, INCOME TAXES CONCISE HISTORY AND PRIMER 9-13 (1993); David Frederick, 
Historical Lessons from the Life and Death of the Federal Estate Tax, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
197, 205 (2007) (citing PAULINE MAIER ET AL., INVENTING AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 527, 719 (2003)). 
 2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(2010) (“[G]ross income does not include . . . the 
amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or 
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal 
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coupled with taxable interest3 or punitive damages.4  These bifurcated 
awards create a host of taxation issues, both theoretical and practical.  
One of the most significant problems for recovering plaintiffs in 
contingency cases is that they must pay the attorney’s fee based on the 
entire taxable and non-taxable amount of the payment, but generally 
enjoy a deduction only to the extent such fees relate to the taxable portion 
of the award.5  Generally, there is no deduction for attorney’s fees or other 
costs that relate to non-taxable awards.6  Additionally, even when such 
attorney’s fees are deductible,7 the deductions are typically miscellaneous 
itemized deductions (“MID”), limited to amounts exceeding two percent 
of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (“AGI”).8  Of perhaps even 
greater concern, the plaintiff’s alternative minimum tax (“AMT”) 
liability, which would be triggered by any significant award or settlement, 
must be computed without miscellaneous itemized deductions, including 
the deduction for attorney’s fees that produce taxable income.9  
                                                                                                                 
physical injuries or physical sickness . . . .”). 
 3. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) includes “[i]nterest” in gross income of taxpayers.  
 4. See, e.g., McCann v. Comm’r, 87 F. App’x. 359, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving 
a settlement payment of $839,000, $400,000 of which was for excludable personal injury 
damages and $439,000 of which was for taxable interest); Kovacs v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 124 
(1993) (settlement after extensive appeal for $2,254,741.70, of which $995,000 was for tax-
free wrongful death damages and $1,253,607.17 was for taxable interest). 
 5. I.R.C. § 212(1) provides a deduction for “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred . . . for the production or collection of income.”  
 6. “No deduction is allowable under section 212 for any amount allocable to the 
production or collection of one or more classes of income which are not includible in gross 
income, or for any amount allocable to the management, conservation, or maintenance of 
property held for the production of income which is not included in gross income.”  Treas. 
Reg. § 1.212-1(e)(2010); see also I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (“No deduction shall be allowed for . . . 
[a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one or more classes 
of income . . . wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle.”). 
 7. For example, when such fees relate to recovering taxable awards, they can be 
considered “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . for the production or 
collection of income” for purposes of I.R.C. § 212(1).  
 8. “[M]iscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year shall be allowed only to 
the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross 
income.”  I.R.C. § 67(a).  The deduction for attorney’s fees provided in I.R.C. § 212 is not 
included in the list of deductions in I.R.C. § 67(b), which are excluded from the 
miscellaneous itemized deductions category.  For example, assuming a taxpayer had an AGI 
of $100,000 and wanted to offset her income with a $2100 MID, two percent of the AGI, or 
$2000, would be a wasted deduction and would not reduce her tax liability.  Only the $100 
of the MID that exceeds the $2000 threshold is potentially useable by the taxpayer to offset 
her income. 
 9. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A). 
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Congress has seemingly recognized these problems but has cherry-
picked the contexts for redress.  Specifically, Congress has provided 
limited relief in the form of an above-the-line deduction for expenses 
incurred in obtaining certain employment and civil rights recoveries,10 but 
not in the more pervasive personal injury context.  This gap in tax 
treatment is normatively unjustified and under-theorized.  This article 
provides a much-needed analysis of the problem and proposes a 
legislative solution. 
One might well object to the inclusion of the attorney’s portion of an 
award or settlement payment in the plaintiff’s gross income based on the 
fact that the money never actually passes through the plaintiff’s hands.  
That is, in most cases involving a contingency fee, the plaintiff’s attorney 
is compensated directly by the defendant with the plaintiff never actually 
possessing the attorney’s portion of the recovery.11  When coupled with 
the fact that the underlying award or settlement payment may be excluded 
from tax because it results from a personal injury or other harm that 
Congress has determined should result in a tax-free recovery, the taxation 
of the plaintiff on the interest and punitive damages portion of the 
attorney’s fee is even more difficult to accept.  Indeed, in many cases, had 
the defendant’s actions not triggered liability for either interest or punitive 
damages, then no portion of the plaintiff’s recovery, and thus no portion 
of the amounts paid to the plaintiff’s attorney, would be taxable to the 
plaintiff.   
These are important concerns, but current doctrine seems to reject 
them.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v. 
Banks,12 it is now clear that the plaintiff must include in her income 
amounts paid to her attorney through contingent fee arrangements.13  With 
such a potentially substantial tax liability lurking after payment, it is 
imperative that all parties to a lawsuit and their respective attorneys and 
advisors fully understand and communicate the tax consequences of such 
                                                                                                                 
 10. I.R.C. § 62(a)(20) provides an “above the line” deduction (i.e., the items deducted 
will not be included in adjusted gross income and will therefore not be subject to the two 
percent floor of I.R.C. § 67) for “attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the 
taxpayer in connection with any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination [certain 
claims against the U.S. government, and certain claims under the Social Security Act],” but 
only to the extent such amounts are includible in the taxpayer’s gross income.  
 11. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 399, 405 (2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 881 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (plaintiff received a $229,501.37 cash settlement, of which $91,800.54 was paid 
directly to the plaintiff’s attorney).  
 12. 543 U.S. 426 (2005). 
 13. Id. at 430; see infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. 
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payments in order to assess with accuracy settlement possibilities and 
prudent management of any funds received.  
Recent scholarship in the area has focused on alternate views of the 
contingent fee arrangement and even the nature of the taxpayer’s asset 
(i.e., the lawsuit).14  It has become apparent in the seven years since the 
Banks decision, however, that a more pragmatic approach is necessary to 
provide relief to taxpayers ensnared by the combination of inclusion of 
the entire award in the plaintiff’s income and the limitations on the 
deductibility of fees and costs when recoveries are obtained pursuant to 
contingent fee arrangements.15  Additionally, previous academic treatment 
has focused primarily on taxpayers that received entirely taxable awards.  
This article, by contrast, attempts to bring to light the role of interest and 
the significant deductibility and AMT limitations faced by taxpayers 
recovering amounts that are partially non-taxable and partially taxable. 
This article proposes expanding Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.” or 
“Code”) §§ 62(a)(20) and 212 to provide an above-the-line deduction for 
all fees and costs incurred in connection with any action involving a claim 
having a recovery which is excluded from gross income under I.R.C. § 
104(a) (i.e., personal injury or sickness recoveries) to the extent that such 
claim results in a recovery that includes a taxable interest component.  
Alternatively, the same relief could be accomplished through enactment 
of a new exclusion in the amount of attorney’s fees (and perhaps other 
costs) paid by a taxpayer in connection with any action involving a 
personal injury or sickness claim, recovery of which is otherwise 
excluded from gross income under Code § 104(a).  Although the process 
of revising the tax code itself can be challenging and fraught with political 
contention,16 once a legislative solution is achieved, taxpayers and their 
advisors will have a greater degree of certainty with respect to the 
potential tax liability flowing from a settlement or award.  
Part I of this article describes the problem presented by the inclusion in 
the plaintiff’s income of the attorney’s portion of the recovery and the 
historical background leading to such inclusion.  Part II explains the 
theoretical basis for the tax treatment of litigation interest, the challenges 
facing plaintiffs and their advisors in allocating fees and costs associated 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
 16. One need only look to the extension of the “Bush Tax Cuts” in December 2010 for 
an example of how politically divisive tax reform can be.  See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn 
& Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Defends Tax Deal, but His Party Stays Hostile, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/us/politics/08cong.html?_r=1. 
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with partially taxable and partially non-taxable awards, and gives an 
illustration of the dramatically different tax results that follow various 
interest and deductibility scenarios.  Part III reviews some of the 
previously proposed solutions to the problem of inclusion of the 
attorney’s fee in the plaintiff’s taxable income.  Part IV suggests two 
alternative legislative approaches — a deduction and an exclusion — 
intended to address the unique tax issues presented to plaintiffs who 
recover non-taxable awards with taxable components, and presents policy 
arguments in favor of a legislative solution.  This article concludes with a 
call for action to adopt a legislative solution for the problems presented 
here. 
I.  The Problem 
A. Inclusion of Attorney’s Portion of the Award and AMT Issues 
Certain recoveries are not taxable from the outset.  For example, the 
Internal Revenue Code specifically excludes from a successful litigant’s 
gross income compensatory recoveries resulting from personal injuries.  
Code § 104(a)(2) provides that “gross income does not include . . . the 
amount of damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by 
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) . . . 
on account of personal physical injuries or personal sickness[.]”17  On the 
other hand, interest is taxable even if it arises out of and is computed on 
an otherwise non-taxable award.  Code § 61(a)(4) states that “gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but 
not limited to) . . . interest.”18  Despite taxpayers’ initial assertions that 
interest should be construed as part and parcel of the non-taxable recovery 
from which it grew, the Treasury and the courts established the separate 
nature of interest apart from the underlying compensatory recovery from 
the early days of the modern federal individual income tax.19  Adhering to 
this paradigm which separates interest from the underlying award requires 
all recoveries that include an interest (or other taxable) component to be 
analyzed on a piecemeal basis.  
 The reduction of the plaintiff’s recovery due to the taxability of the 
interest portion of an otherwise non-taxable award is only the beginning 
of the plaintiff’s burden.  In personal injury cases, plaintiffs almost 
                                                                                                                 
 17. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2010). 
 18. Id. § 61(a)(4).  
 19. See Riddle v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 1339, 1939-41 (1933). 
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always retain attorneys pursuant to a contingency fee contract.20  This 
arrangement allows plaintiffs access to the courts without much, if any, 
upfront cost.21  The tradeoff is that the plaintiff must pay her attorney a 
percentage of the ultimate recovery when received.  This percentage may 
range from twenty percent of the recovery if the claim is settled easily and 
early to fifty percent or more if trial and appeal work are involved.22  
Moreover, the contingent attorney’s fee is typically determined based on 
the plaintiff’s entire recovery, including both the non-taxable personal 
injury recovery and any interest received.23  
The depletion of the plaintiff’s recovery could be mitigated somewhat 
by an effective deduction for the fees incurred to procure the recovery.  In 
fact, Code § 212(1) provides a deduction for “ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred . . . for the production or collection of 
income[.]”24  The plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and other costs paid to obtain 
certain recoveries no doubt are “for the production or collection of 
income.”  The deduction of such amounts, however, is limited to the 
extent they relate to only the taxable portion of the recovery.25  According 
to the regulations, no § 212 deduction is allowed “for any amount 
allocable to the production of one or more classes of income which are 
not includible in gross income, or for any amount allocable to the 
                                                                                                                 
 20. “Virtually all tort claiming is financed by plaintiff lawyers through the medium of 
contingent fees.”  Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort 
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 68 (2003).  A 1989 report by 
the Federal Trade Commission reported that 97% of injury cases were taken on a 
contingency fee basis, regardless of generous offers for an hourly rate.  WALTER K. OLSON, 
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 47 (1991). 
 21. See Sharon Reece, Lemonade from Lemons: The Solution to Taxation of the 
Contingent Fee Portion of Damage Awards, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 305, 337 (2004). 
 22. Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: 
Their Impact on Settlements Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2164 n.37 (1992) 
(“Typically, the contingency percentage is one third of all proceeds, although it reportedly 
reaches 50% in some cases.”) (citing OLSON, supra note 20, at 47).  While a common 
practice is to have a constant percentage (typically one-third of the recovery), “some 
attorneys vary the percentage depending on the stage of litigation, e.g., 30% of settlement 
proceeds and 50% of trial judgment proceeds.”  Id. (citing John J. Donohue, The Effects of 
Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and 
Contingency Fees, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 210 n.55).  
 23. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 124, 126 (1993) (plaintiff recovered 
$2,254,741.70 of which $1,253,607.17 was interest and $749,535.72 was paid directly to the 
attorney under a one-third contingency fee). 
 24. I.R.C. § 212(1) (2010). 
 25. Id. § 265(a)(2). 
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management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the 
production of income which is not included in gross income.”26  Further, 
Code § 265(a)(2) provides that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed for . . . 
[a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one 
or more classes of income . . . wholly exempt from taxes imposed by this 
subtitle . . . .”27  This result was confirmed in Church v. Commissioner, in 
which the Tax Court stated:  “[t]o the extent [the attorney’s fees and 
costs] are allocable to the interest portion of the award, however, they are 
deductible under section 212(1) as an expense incurred for the production 
of income.  To the extent they are allocable to exempt income, they are 
nondeductible under section 265(1).”28 
Furthermore, the deductions that are allowed to a plaintiff for fees and 
costs incurred to produce taxable income are severely limited, and in 
many cases worthless.  The § 212 deduction for the production or 
collection of income is a miscellaneous itemized deduction, as it is not 
referenced in Code § 67(b), which contains the list of itemized deductions 
that are excluded from the miscellaneous itemized category.29  The 
miscellaneous itemized deduction designation means that until such 
amounts exceed two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, no 
deduction is available.30  
More drastically, the alternative minimum tax (“AMT”) requires 
taxpayers to calculate their taxes on an alternative tax system without the 
use of any miscellaneous itemized deductions, including the deduction for 
attorney’s fees that produce taxable income.31  While originally enacted to 
address perceived inequities attributable to the fact that some high-income 
taxpayers paid almost nothing in taxes, the AMT now ensnares 
individuals with a wide range of incomes.32  Taxpayers will be subject to 
the AMT if the tax liability on their alternative minimum taxable income 
(“AMTI”) is greater than the tax liability on their regular taxable 
income.33  Individuals are subject to twenty-six percent (up to $175,000 
for joint returns and $87,500 for single returns) or twenty-eight percent 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(e)(2010).  
 27. I.R.C. § 265(a)(2).  
 28. 80 T.C. 1104, 1110-11 (1983). 
 29. I.R.C. § 67(b). 
 30. Id. § 67(a).  See supra note 8 for an example of the operation of the cap on 
miscellaneous itemized deductions. 
 31. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A). 
 32. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 208-09 (11th ed. 2009). 
 33. I.R.C. § 55(a).  
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(on amounts exceeding $175,000 for joint returns and $87,500 for single 
returns) rates on the AMTI.34  For 2011, there were separate AMT 
exemptions in the amount of $74,450 for married taxpayers filing jointly 
and $48,450 for single individuals.35  These exemptions are subject to a 
twenty-five percent phase-out, however, beginning when joint return 
taxpayers’ AMTI exceeds $150,000 and when a single taxpayer’s AMTI 
exceeds $112,500.36  The result is that the AMT exemption is effectively 
eliminated for joint return taxpayers at AMTI of $447,80037 and for single 
taxpayers at AMTI of $306,300.38  Accordingly, plaintiffs with even 
relatively modest recoveries will be subject to the highest AMT rates and 
will have no use of the miscellaneous itemized deduction for attorney’s 
fees incurred to generate their recovery income.39  As such, the non-
deductibility of fees and expenses related to non-taxable recoveries and 
the severe limitations on deductibility of fees and expenses related to 
taxable recoveries combine to form an extremely unfavorable tax 
environment for plaintiffs recovering partially taxable and partially non-
taxable awards. 
B.  Historical Background on Inclusion 
Although it was only recently settled by the Supreme Court that a 
taxpayer cannot exclude from income the recovered amounts paid directly 
to the attorney through contingent fee arrangements, the development of 
the issues in play hearkens back to seminal tax case law and well-worn 
doctrine.  The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Commissioner v. Banks40 
resolved a split among the circuit courts of appeals41 by determining that 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. § 55(b)(1)(A).  
 35. Id. § 55(d)(1).  Because the AMT exemption is not automatically adjusted for 
inflation, after 2011 these exemption amounts are scheduled to return to the statutory 
$45,000 for joint returns and $33,750 for single individuals.  Id.  
 36. Id. § 55(d)(3).  
 37. $74,450 x 4 + $150,000. 
 38. $48,450 x 4 + $112,500. 
 39. See generally Brant J. Hellwig & Gregg D. Polsky, Litigation Expenses and the 
Alternative Minimum Tax, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 899 (2004); Ilir Mujalovic, Yet Another 
Alternative Minimum Tax Disaster: How a Recovery of Damages Turns into a Liability, 47 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355 (2003). 
 40. 543 U.S. 426 (2005). 
 41. The split divided the Second, Fourth, Seventh, some Ninth Circuit courts, and the 
Federal Circuits (requiring inclusion of the plaintiff’s entire recovery in its gross income) 
from the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and other Ninth Circuit courts (allowing plaintiffs to reduce 
gross income by amounts not actually received by the plaintiff).  See Leah Witcher Jackson, 
Won the Legal Battle, but at What Tax Cost to Your Client: Tax Consequences of 
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even if a portion of the plaintiff’s taxable award is paid directly to his or 
her attorney under a contingency fee arrangement, that amount is taxed to 
the plaintiff.42  In sustaining the Commissioner’s objection to the 
taxpayers’ exclusion of the portion of the award paid directly to the 
taxpayers’ attorneys, the Court held that “[a]s a general rule, when a 
litigant’s recovery constitutes income, the litigant’s income includes the 
portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee.”43  The 
Court relied heavily on the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine to 
reach this conclusion in Banks, stating that it agreed with the 
Commissioner’s position “that a contingent-fee arrangement should be 
viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a portion of the 
client’s income from any litigation recovery.”44  Accordingly, a brief 
review of the origins of the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is 
in order.   
The assignment of income doctrine traces its roots to the venerable 
Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Earl.45  In Earl, the taxpayer, Guy 
Earl, and his wife entered into an agreement in 1901 that provided that all 
property (including salaries, fees, etc.) then owned or thereafter acquired 
by either spouse would be deemed held by both spouses as joint tenants 
with rights of survivorship.46  This was intended simply to avoid probate 
for a portion of their property, as no federal individual income tax was in 
effect at the time of the 1901 agreement.47  Mr. Earl was a successful 
attorney in California and a man of substantial means.48  By the time of 
the final decision in 1930, the 1901 agreement would have given the Earls 
a significant break from the progressive income tax rates, as both spouses 
could have utilized lower marginal rates.49  In holding that, 
notwithstanding the couple’s agreement, all income earned by Mr. Earl 
was taxable to him alone, Justice Holmes set forth one of the most 
recognizable tenets in all of tax law:  
                                                                                                                 
Contingency Fee Arrangements Leading up to and after Commissioner v. Banks, 57 
BAYLOR L. REV. 47, 53 (2005). 
 42. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430. 
 43. Id. at 430. 
 44. Id. at 434. 
 45. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).   
 46. Id. at 113-14; see also Patricia A. Cain, The Story of Earl: How Echoes (and 
Metaphors) from the Past Continue to Shape the Assignment of Income Doctrine, in TAX 
STORIES 305 (Paul A. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 47. WILLAN, supra note 1, at 4. 
 48. Cain, supra note 46, at 313-15. 
 49. Id. at 315.  
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There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those 
who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped 
by anticipatory assignments . . . and we think that no 
distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the 
arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree 
from that on which they grew.50  
In other words, although the assignment of Mr. Earl’s future earnings 
may have been an effective transfer under state law, it would not serve to 
bifurcate his taxable income.51  Consequently, taxpayers and their 
advisors have spent much of the last eighty-two years trying to ensure 
their fruit does not wander to another’s tree. 
Building on the pronouncement in Earl of the anticipatory assignment 
of income doctrine in the context of income derived from services (i.e., 
Mr. Earl’s legal fees), the 1940 Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. 
Horst52 applied the assignment of income doctrine to income derived from 
property.  In Horst, the taxpayer owned corporate bonds with detachable 
interest coupons.53  The taxpayer detached several of the coupons prior to 
maturity and gifted them to his son, in essence assigning away the interest 
from the bonds while retaining the underlying bond instrument.54  When 
the son cashed the coupons at maturity, the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”), and subsequently, the Supreme Court, determined that the father, 
rather than the son, should be taxed on the interest.55  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court ruled that direction of disposition of the right to 
receive interest while retaining ownership was equivalent to an exercise 
of ownership over the interest itself.56  Accordingly, this transfer should 
produce the same result as the father’s first receiving the income and then 
transferring it to his son.  
Earl and Horst laid a foundation for a rather expansive view of the 
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, whether addressing income 
derived from property or services.  There may be no more liberal 
interpretation of that doctrine than that employed in Commissioner v. 
Banks.57  The Supreme Court’s Banks decision was a consolidation of two 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15.   
 51. Id. at 114. 
 52. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
 53. Id. at 114. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 114, 120.  
 56. Id. at 116-18. 
 57. 543 U.S. 426 (2005). 
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cases:  Commissioner v. Banaitis,58 and Commissioner v. Banks.59  Both 
cases involved underlying awards or settlements that were taxable at the 
time of recovery.60  In Banaitis, a loan officer had settled with his 
employer on a wrongful discharge complaint, of which $4,864,547 was 
paid to the plaintiff and $3,864,012 was paid directly to his attorneys.61  
The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiff was allowed to exclude 
from his taxable income the portion of the recovery paid directly to his 
attorneys.62  This decision was based largely on the applicable state’s 
attorney lien law, which was interpreted essentially to transfer to the 
attorney a portion of the plaintiff’s cause of action.63  The satisfaction of 
the attorney’s portion of the claim at settlement was construed as merely a 
recovery by the attorney on the attorney’s separate property interest, 
essentially as a co-tenant with the plaintiff.64 
Similarly, Banks involved a settlement in the amount of $464,000 for 
an alleged employment discrimination and civil rights violation, of which 
$150,000 was paid to the plaintiff’s attorney.65  The Sixth Circuit refused 
to apply the assignment of income doctrine of Earl, giving the following 
reasons:  (1) the claim was merely a contingent expectancy at the time the 
attorney was retained; (2) the lawsuit was tantamount to a partnership or 
joint venture, two-thirds owned by the plaintiff, and one-third owned by 
the attorney; (3) the agreement was not motivated by tax avoidance; and 
(4) application of the doctrine would result in double taxation.66  
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Banaitis 
and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Banks in a consolidated case, holding 
that the taxpayer plaintiffs should include in their income the portion of 
litigation recovery paid to their attorneys pursuant to contingent fee 
                                                                                                                 
 58. 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 59. 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 60. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430-31. 
 61. 340 F.3d at 1078.  
 62. Id. at 1081. 
 63. Id. at 1081-82. 
Oregon law . . . affords attorneys generous property interests in judgments and 
settlements . . . .  Put simply, Oregon law vests attorneys with property interests 
that cannot be extinguished or discharged by the parties to the action except by 
payment to the attorney . . . .  Because of the unique features of Oregon law, we 
conclude that fees paid directly to [the attorney] were not includable in 
Banaitis’ gross income for the relevant year.” 
Id. at 1082-83.  
 64. Id. at 1083. 
 65. Comm’r v. Banks, 345 F.3d 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 66. Id. at 386. 
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agreements.67  The Court based its reasoning, in large part, on the 
assignment of income doctrine initially set forth in Earl.68  The Court 
stated, “[t]he Commissioner maintains that a contingent-fee agreement 
should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a 
portion of the client’s income from any litigation recovery. We agree with 
the Commissioner.”69  Accordingly, gains should be taxed to those who 
earn them, and taxpayers should be prevented from avoiding taxation 
through arrangements and contracts devised to prevent income when paid 
from vesting (even for a second) in the one who earned it.  The Court 
likewise drew comparison to Horst,70 a more analogous case than Earl,71 
in that it addressed assignment of income from property rather than 
services (assuming one views the income-producing asset in Banks as 
property in the form of the lawsuit or cause of action).72  The Banks Court 
cited Horst for the proposition that the taxpayer who owns or controls the 
source of income also controls the disposition of that which he could have 
received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the 
means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants.73  The Court in Banks 
determined that the income-generating asset in that case was the cause of 
action itself, which clearly remains in the dominion and control of the 
plaintiff until recovery, despite the plaintiff’s suggestion that the attorney-
client relationship should be viewed as a sort of business partnership or 
joint venture for tax purposes.74  The application of the assignment of 
income doctrine by the Supreme Court in Banks has been persuasively 
criticized in subsequent scholarship,75 but is unlikely to be overturned in 
the near future.   
                                                                                                                 
 67. Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 430 (2005).  
 68. Id. at 434 (“As Lucas explained, ‘no distinction can be taken according to the 
motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from 
that on which they grew.” (citations omitted)). 
 69. Id.  
 70. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
 71. 281 U.S. 111 (1929). 
 72. See generally Katherine D. Black, Michael D. Black & Stephen T. Black, Taxation 
of Contingency Fees: Deductions for Expenses?, TAX NOTES, Feb. 8, 2010, at 1. 
 73. 543 U.S. at 434-35. 
 74. Id. at 435-36.  
 75. See Brant J. Hellwig, The Supreme Court’s Casual Use of the Assignment of Income 
Doctrine, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 751 (arguing against the Supreme Court’s expansion of the 
assignment of income doctrine to arm’s length assignments for consideration, and noting 
that the same conclusion could have been reached in Banks simply by finding that taxpayers 
realize a taxable benefit when their obligations to compensation their attorneys is 
discharged).  See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of the criticism of the assignment of 
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The precise tax issue involved in Banks was addressed by legislation 
even before the case was decided. After the controversies comprising 
Banks arose, Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.76  
The Act added current Code § 62(a)(20), allowing a taxpayer, in 
computing adjusted gross income, to deduct attorney’s fees and court 
costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in connection with any action 
involving a claim of unlawful discrimination.77  Because these are so-
called “above-the-line” deductions, they may be taken even when the 
AMT applies and are not subject to the two percent of adjusted gross 
income (“AGI”) floor.78  Since this amendment effectively eliminated 
much of the concern of potentially overreaching taxation in the Banks 
case, the attention of practitioners, and perhaps scholars, has been 
somewhat diminished.  
However, the Banks opinion still stands for the proposition that a 
plaintiff, whose award is otherwise taxable, will not be able to exclude 
that portion of the recovery that is directly paid to the attorney.79  As 
described above, interest paid on a taxpayer’s non-taxable recovery (e.g., 
for physical injuries) is taxable itself.80  When combined with the holding 
of Banks, this means that the prevailing plaintiff is really paying tax on 
the attorney’s portion of the interest recovery as well.   
The post-Code § 62(a)(20) enactment issues unique to partially taxable 
and partially non-taxable awards are illuminated by the facts of Estate of 
Clarks v. United States,81 which is directly referenced in Banks.82  On 
June 28, 1988, the family of Arthur Clarks received a jury verdict in the 
amount of $9,400,000 against K-Mart for injuries Mr. Clarks incurred 
when he was unloading a truck at a K-Mart facility.83  Arthur Clarks’ 
portion of the award was $5,600,000, plus interest, and the remainder was 
                                                                                                                 
income doctrine. 
 76. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546 (2004). 
 77. I.R.C. § 62(e)(2010) defines “unlawful discrimination” to include any act that is 
unlawful, for example, under certain provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Housing Act, and numerous other federal, state, and 
local laws. 
 78. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A). 
 79. 543 U.S. at 430. 
 80. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).  
 81. No. 96-CV-60446-AA, 1998 WL 839415, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 1998), rev’d, 
202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 82. 543 U.S. at 431. 
 83. Clarks, 1998 WL 839415, at *1. 
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awarded to his wife and children on their claims.84  After an extensive 
appeals process, K-Mart paid Clarks $11,307,837.55 in satisfaction of his 
portion of the judgment in 1991.85  This amount consisted of $5,600,000 
for the jury award and $5,707,837.55 in interest.86  Clarks paid his 
attorneys a total fee of $3,766,471.21 ($1,901,314.67 based on the interest 
portion of the award, and $1,865,156.54 based on the damages award) and 
costs in the amount of $8,432.90.87  It was undisputed that the $5,600,000 
resulting from the jury’s award was not taxable.88  Clarks died in 1992, 
and his estate was assessed a deficiency of $254,298 because it failed to 
report the interest used to pay attorney’s fees and the portion of the costs 
that related to judgment interest.89  The IRS argued that the interest paid 
on a personal injury judgment was taxable, whether paid to an attorney 
under a contingency agreement or not.90  The amounts payable to the 
attorney with respect to the interest award would, however, be a below-
the-line miscellaneous itemized deduction, subject to the two percent AGI 
limitation and not allowed in computing the alternative minimum tax.91  
While the district court agreed with the IRS, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
amounts paid directly to the attorney were not taxable.92  Looking to the 
fruit-and-tree metaphor of Lucas v. Earl, the Sixth Circuit concluded with 
the following analogy: 
The present transaction under scrutiny is more like a division 
of property than an assignment of income.  Here the client as 
assignor has transferred some of the trees in his orchard, not 
merely the fruit from the trees.  The lawyer has become a 
tenant in common of the orchard owner and must cultivate and 
care for and harvest the fruit of the entire tract.  Here the 
lawyer’s income is the result of his personal skill and 
judgment, not the skill or largess of a family member who 
wants to split his income to avoid taxation.  The income should 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id.  
 85. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Clarks, 1998 WL 839415, at *1. 
 88. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855.  “At no time has the non-interest portion of the award 
($5,600,000) been at issue since it is clearly not taxable as income pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 
104(a)(2).”  Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 92. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858. 
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be charged to the one who earned it and received it, not as 
under the government’s theory of the case, to the one who 
neither received it nor earned it.93 
While this distinction was particularly compelling in the Clarks case, 
which involved an underlying non-taxable award, the Sixth Circuit’s 
ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court in Banks.94  Accordingly, 
under current Supreme Court doctrine, amounts paid directly to attorneys 
under contingent fee arrangements, even when the underlying claim is 
exempt from tax, are taxable to the plaintiff.95 
II.  The Role of Interest in Litigation 
A.  The Theory of Litigation Interest 
A brief review of the policies supporting the taxation of interest and 
disallowing deductions for expenses related to procuring non-taxable 
interest as well as the purposes served by interest in the litigation context 
reveals how, in the context of partially taxable and partially non-taxable 
recoveries, the current tax regime frustrates those policies.  In 1967, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals effectively described the policy behind 
disallowing deductions for tax-exempt income in concluding that 
deductions should not be allowed for a fiduciary’s fee to the extent such 
fee is related to the management of municipal bonds that produced tax-
exempt interest.96  The court stated: 
Not only does the language of the statute suggest that both §§ 
212(1) and (2) expenses must be apportioned between taxable 
and nontaxable income; the policy underlying the statute also 
suggests the same result . . . .  [I]n 1941 the Supreme Court 
held [in Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941)] that 
investment counseling expenses were not deductible because 
the then applicable section of the Code only allowed 
deductions for “trade or business expenses.”  However, since 
nonbusiness income was included in gross income, Congress 
enacted what is now §§ 212(1) and (2) which provides that 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. at 858. 
 94. Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 431 (2005).  Indeed, the Supreme Court cited 
Clarks twice as the opinion on which the Sixth Circuit relied in achieving its decision in 
Banks.  Id. at 431. 
 95. Id. at 429-30. 
 96. Whittemore v. United States, 383 F.2d 824, 833-34 (8th Cir. 1967). 
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certain nonbusiness expenses are deductible.  Thus, by 
providing for nonbusiness expenses, Congress furthered the 
underlying philosophy of a tax on net income rather than on 
gross income.97  
The court bolstered this historical context by including a statement of 
Representative Wesley Disney:  
The Internal Revenue Code provides that expenses incurred in 
the trade or business of the taxpayer may be deducted in 
arriving at net income.  The law also provides that personal, 
living or family expenses may not be deducted.  There is left a 
great border-land of doubt . . . .  Since the income from such 
investments is clearly taxable it is inequitable to deny the 
deduction of expenses attributable to such investments.98 
Accordingly, the enactment of Code §§ 212(1) and (2) provided 
matching of nonbusiness expenses with nonbusiness income.99  Likewise, 
to the extent that the nonbusiness income was excluded from the gross 
taxable income, the corresponding expense should not be allowed.  
Otherwise, “the taxpayer would receive a double advantage in that he 
could take a deduction against other taxable income and yet receive tax 
free the income to which the expense related.  The purpose of § 265(1) is 
to eliminate this double advantage.”100  
The “double advantage” would certainly accrue if a deduction were 
allowed for expenses paid or incurred to obtain tax-exempt bond interest.  
Likewise, a plaintiff recovering an entirely tax-exempt amount would be 
doubly advantaged if she were allowed to offset other taxable income 
(e.g., her salary) by the legal expenses and court costs incurred to obtain 
the non-taxable amount.  The figures that follow, however, will 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. at 833. 
 98. Id. at 834 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 46, 74-76 (1942)).  The existing law 
allows taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in connection with a trade or business.  Due 
partly to the inadequacy of the statute and partly to court decisions, nontrade or nonbusiness 
expenses are not deductible, although nontrade or nonbusiness income is fully subject to tax.  
The bill corrects this inequity by allowing all of the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred for the production or collection of income or for the management, conservation, or 
maintenance of property held for the production of income.  Thus, whether or not the 
expense is in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business, if it is expended in the pursuit 
of income or in connection with property held for the production of income, it is allowable.  
H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 74-76. 
 99. Whittemore, 383 F.2d at 834.  
 100. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
342 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:325 
 
 
demonstrate that no such advantage is likely when a plaintiff’s recovery 
includes a taxable interest component.  Instead, the plaintiff recovering 
taxable interest on top of an otherwise non-taxable award will usually 
have significant costs involved, tied to both the taxable and non-taxable 
components of the award, and an often worthless deduction for those 
costs.  Therefore, it is at least not inconsistent with the policy behind the 
limitation of Code § 265 to allow a deduction for expenditures made to 
procure such recoveries to the extent income is ultimately taxed.  
As to the purpose of interest in litigation, the primary consideration 
seems to be one of making the plaintiff whole for the plaintiff’s losses by 
compensating the plaintiff for the lost time value of money when the 
plaintiff had no access to the ultimate recovery.  This theory is applicable 
to both pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest:101  “The award 
of interest is founded on the theory that there has been a deprivation of 
use of money or its equivalent and that the sole function of interest is to 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See generally City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 
195 (1995) (“The essential rationale for awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that an 
injured party is fully compensated for its loss.”).  This purpose has been expressed by a 
number of courts in both the pre-judgment and post-judgment contexts. 
The purpose of the award of prejudgment interest is to make the plaintiff whole 
from the date of the loss once the jury determines the defendant’s liability for 
damages and their amount.  Once the jury sets the amount of damages to be 
awarded, the damages are retroactively considered liquidated damages, and the 
plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest back to the date that the damages 
were due. 
Capitol Env’t. Servs., Inc. v. Earth Tech., Inc., 25 So.3d 593, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212, 215 (Fla. 1985)).  
[T]he purpose of postjudgment interest is to compensate the successful plaintiff 
for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between the 
ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant . . . .  The 
verdict assesses damages up to the time that it is rendered; however, payment 
does not occur immediately upon return of the verdict.  Postjudgment interest 
represents the cost of withholding the amount owed the plaintiff once that sum 
has been determined in a court proceeding. 
Poleto v. Consol. Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1280 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Turner v. Japan 
Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d 752, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1983); Hooks v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 
614, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Brian P. Miller, Comment, Statutory Post-Judgment 
Interest: The Effect of Legislative Changes After Judgment And Suggestions for 
Construction, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 609-10 (1994) (stating, “[t]here are two discernible 
purposes for post-judgment interest:  1) compensation to the judgment creditor for not 
having use of the money owed; and 2) punishment of the judgment debtor to encourage him 
or her to pay the judgment without undue delay. . . .  Judicial decisions in very few states 
have viewed post-judgment interest as a measure designed to punish the judgment debtor for 
not paying the amount of the judgment.” (citations omitted)). 
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make whole the party aggrieved.  It is not to provide a windfall for either 
party.”102  Again, “The allowance of interest rests on an attempt by courts 
to award compensation to the plaintiff for the delay involved between the 
date of the injury (the time that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation) 
and the date of the award or judgment.”103 
If one accepts that interest awarded on personal injury recoveries is 
simply designed to keep the plaintiff in the same position economically as 
when the original judgment was awarded or the injury was suffered, then 
tax policy should promote this purpose and not punish the taxpayer whose 
personal injury award is coupled with interest.  This policy would 
possibly support exclusion of the interest entirely from income of the 
plaintiff.  However, I do not go that far.  Instead, I propose that, because 
in most cases the assignment of income doctrine requires inclusion of 
both the plaintiff’s recovery and the attorney’s recovery in the plaintiff’s 
income, the plaintiff should be allowed either a deduction to the extent of 
income inclusion or the ability to exclude interest income to the extent of 
the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenditures incurred in the case (not just 
expenditures incurred to produce the taxable income).  This approach best 
approximates the amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole when the 
plaintiff’s entire tax situation is considered, yet prevents a complete 
windfall for the plaintiff by limiting the deduction or exclusion to her 
actual expenses. 
B.  Allocation of Fees and Costs Related to Interest 
Having established that the portion of a successful plaintiff’s recovery 
paid directly to the attorney under a contingent fee arrangement must be 
included in the plaintiff’s gross income and that the plaintiff is only 
allowed a deduction under Code § 212 for attorney’s fees and court costs 
to the extent that such expenses relate to the recovery of taxable income, 
one must determine how to allocate the amount of the expenses between 
those that relate to taxable recoveries and those that relate to non-taxable 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Joseph L. Marino, Judgments and Their Enforcements, in Civil Practice Law and 
Rules, in 3 WEST’S MCKINNEY’S FORMS CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES § 8:3 (2011) 
(citing 155 Henry Owners Corp. v. Lovlyn Realty Co., 647 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1996); Kaiser v. 
Fishman, 590 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1992); 5 WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ¶ 
5001.10)). 
 103. Jacob A. Stein, Attorney’s Fees and Interest, in 3 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY 
DAMAGES TREATISE § 17:58 (3d ed. 2011). 
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recoveries.104  There are at least two alternative approaches that could 
apply to this allocation:  (1) divide the expenses between taxable and non-
taxable amounts according to the split of the ultimate recovery between 
such amounts (a proportionate approach) or (2) divide the expenses based 
on the amount of the work or nature of costs actually related to the 
respective recoveries (an “origin of the claim”105 approach).106  
Case law appears to support a proportionate division of the expenses 
based on the relative amounts of the ultimate recovery that are taxable and 
non-taxable.  In Church v. Commissioner,107 the plaintiff taxpayer 
recovered $250,000 of excludable compensatory personal injury damages, 
$235,000 of punitive damages (also excludable under the Commissioner’s 
concession), and $140,872.71 of taxable interest.108  The taxpayer also 
paid $253,568.85 in attorney’s fees and court costs pursuant to a 
contingent fee arrangement.109  The Tax Court determined that “due to 
[its] holding that part of the total award is exempt from income, the 
$253,568.85 in attorney’s fees . . . must be allocated between the exempt 
portion and the non-exempt portion of the award.”110  The court decided 
that the appropriate allocation formula was to multiply the total attorney’s 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 124, 133 (1993) (“The parties have agreed 
that if we hold that petitioners’ interest award is includable in income, the attorney’s fees 
attributable to interest are deductible under section 212(1).  Because we have held that the 
interest is includable in income, petitioners will be allowed to deduct the portion of their 
attorney’s fees attributable to interest.”) (citing Stocks v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 1, 18 (1992); 
Metzger v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 834, 860 (1987), aff’d without published opinion, 845 F.2d 
1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Church v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110-11 (1983)).  
 105. See Black, Black, & Black, supra note 72, at 2 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
200823012 (Mar. 10, 2008)). 
 106. While these approaches appear to carry the day, there are occasional cases in which 
the IRS appears to concede that the portion of the attorney’s fee relating to the non-taxable 
recovery could simply be excluded from the plaintiff’s income.  For example, in Sinyard v. 
Commissioner, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001), the court noted that “legal fees and costs of 
$63,152 were allocated to the nontaxed personal injury damages and by agreement with the 
Commissioner excluded from income.”  Id. at 758 (emphasis added).  The $63,152 of 
excluded legal fees and costs was exactly 20 percent of the $315,760 total attorney’s fees.  
The plaintiff’s non-taxable personal injury award was exactly 20 percent of his total 
settlement ($109,429 excluded personal injury component/$547,146 total settlement).  Id.  
This may have been a strategic concession on the part of the IRS in order to avoid litigation 
of the IRS’s then-uncertain (i.e., pre-Banks) position that the attorney’s fees could be 
included in the plaintiff’s income in a contingent fee situation. 
 107. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).  
 108. Id. at 1106. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 1111. 
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fee by a fraction, the numerator of which was the non-exempt (i.e. 
taxable) income and the denominator of which was the total award.111  
Following that approach, “[t]he proper allocation result[ed] in a section 
212(1) deduction of $57,073.80[,]”112 determined as follows: 
 
“$253,568.85[attorney’s fees and costs]  x  $140,872.71 (non-exempt income)  =  $57,073.80”113 
0000000000000000000000000000000 000$625,872.71 (total award) 
 
While this approach is perhaps the most intuitive and straightforward, it 
focuses on the ultimate result of the award or settlement instead of the 
nature of the expenses incurred to produce the recovery.114  An argument 
could be made that legal expenses paid in pursuit of a partially taxable 
recovery should only be deductible to the extent that such expenses 
related specifically to the taxable portion of the recovery and not to the 
non-taxable recovery.  This would be similar to the origin-of-the-claim 
analysis employed in determining the deductibility of expenses that are 
partially personal and partially business related.  For example, in United 
States v. Gilmore,115 the Supreme Court was tasked with determining the 
deductibility of a husband’s legal expenses incurred in divorce 
proceedings against his wife related to a division of assets, some of which 
were the husband’s business ventures.116  The Gilmore Court found 
in favor of the view that the origin and character of the claim 
with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its 
potential consequences upon the fortune of the taxpayer, is the 
controlling basic test of whether the expense was ‘business’ or 
‘personal’ and hence whether it is deductible or not.117 
This approach is likewise utilized to allocate legal expenses between 
deductible business expenses and capital expenditures.118  
Although the origin-of-the-claim approach is appealing for consistency, 
allocating the attorney’s fees and court costs between amounts related to 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 1111 n.8. 
 114. See Black, Black, & Black, supra note 72, at 2-3. 
 115. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).  
 116. Id. at 40. 
 117. Id. at 49. 
 118. See, e.g., Clements v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1981-530 (1981) (“Whether legal fees 
are deductible business expenses or capital expenditures depends on the ‘origin-of-the-
claim.’”) (citing Redwood Empire Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 960, 977 (1977)).  
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recovery of non-taxable and taxable portions would be difficult, if not 
impossible, in many cases.  In particular, in contingent fee arrangements, 
attorneys often do not track hours worked on the case.119  Because the fee 
agreement is not based on hourly rates, contingent fee compensated 
attorneys do not have the same need to allocate hours worked to particular 
clients that hourly-compensated attorneys have.  Further, even if the 
plaintiff’s attorney did track time spent on the case, it may be extremely 
difficult to allocate time between work performed to produce the taxable 
interest (or punitive) damage award and that done in furtherance of the 
non-taxable personal injury award.120  Indeed, the interest or punitive 
award in most cases would not exist without the personal injury award, so 
the amounts are inextricably tied to each other.  Consider an attorney 
representing a personal injury plaintiff who won a judgment at the trial 
court level that carried post-judgment interest, and was required to defend 
that judgment on appeal.  The attorney would undoubtedly have a difficult 
time distinguishing hours spent advocating for the affirmation of the 
underlying award from those spent arguing to retain the interest 
component of the award.  Although there will be clear cases where the 
amount or computation of interest is the only issue on appeal, those cases 
will likely be rare, and any requirement to allocate hours or other work 
product would be fraught with technical hurdles and extreme confusion.  
C.  Illustration 
To illustrate the potential impact of interest over time on the litigant 
taxpayer as well as the different allocation of expense approaches, let us 
explore the following fact pattern:  Plaintiff is injured in a commercial 
vehicle accident and ultimately awarded $3,000,000 in compensatory 
damages.  Post-judgment interest runs at ten percent per annum beginning 
the day after the judgment is rendered.  To isolate the deduction problem 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See, e.g., Mardirossian & Assocs. v. Ersoff, 153 Cal. App. 4th 257, 270 (2007) 
(“Although none of M & A’s contingency fee lawyers kept billing records, each planned to 
testify that he or she could recall the amount of time spent in total on Ersoff’s case, albeit not 
the amount of time spent preparing each piece of correspondence, discovery or pleading.”). 
 120. Whether a pro rata approach accurately reflects the costs of producing the taxable 
and tax-exempt portions is questionable.  An allocation of fees based on the actual time 
spent on each claim may present a more accurate alternative.  However, rigorous records of 
hourly fees are typically not maintained in litigation governed by contingent fee agreements.  
Moreover, overlapping benefits from efforts to pursue taxable and tax-exempt claims may 
make it difficult to trace attorney time to a particular claim over another.  Edward A. Morse, 
Taxing Plaintiffs: A Look at Tax Accounting for Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Costs, 107 
DICK. L. REV. 405, 490-91 (2003) (citations omitted). 
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and to simplify the calculation, assume that the plaintiff is unmarried, has 
no dependents, and has no additional sources of income or itemized 
deductions.121  The plaintiff has entered into a contingent fee arrangement 
with the attorney which entitles the attorney to forty-five percent of the 
gross recovery at any stage of the litigation beyond the jury trial.122  
Finally, assume litigation expenses incurred to obtain the award will be 
approximately ten percent of the recovery. All figures are based on tax 
liability for 2011. 
If the plaintiff were paid immediately after the jury trial, the plaintiff 
would pocket approximately $1,350,000 after paying her attorney 
$1,350,000 and litigation costs of $300,000. 
 
Figure 1 
Immediate Payment Following Jury Trial
$3,000,000 Non-taxable recovery
($1,350,000) Attorney’s Fee (45%)
($300,000) Costs
$1,350,000 Net to Plaintiff
 
However, let us assume (very realistically) that in addition to the 
commercial vehicle driver and the driver’s employer or contracting firm, 
several insurance carriers are named as parties, and appeals and additional 
proceedings continued for at least five years following the jury verdict.  
After five years, with interest compounding monthly, the interest 
component is $1,935,000 and the gross recovery has grown from 
$3,000,000 to $4,935,000.  At this point, the plaintiff would be 
responsible for an attorney’s fee of approximately $2,220,000 at forty-five 
percent.  Although it is likely the attorney might have negotiated for a 
higher percentage of the recovery by this time, and that litigation costs 
                                                                                                                 
 121. While not the subject of this article, the state tax impact is too significant to 
completely ignore.  To this end, I have included calculations reflecting some very typical 
state tax consequences for the plaintiff.  Assume for these purposes that the plaintiff is a 
resident of Kansas and pays Kansas state income tax on any taxable portion of the award.  
Kansas has compressed marginal individual income tax rates similar to the federal individual 
income tax system.  For an individual (non-joint) filer, a tax rate of 3.5% applies to the first 
$15,000 of Kansas income; a rate of 6.25% applies to income between $15,000 and $30,000 
and a rate of 6.45% applies to any excess of $30,000. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,110 (2008).  
 122. Again, this number would likely vary between one-third and fifty percent at various 
points during the litigation, but for the sake of simplicity and isolating the tax issues, I have 
maintained a forty-five percent attorney’s fee throughout the illustration. 
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would have risen as well, we will keep the contingent fee percentage and 
total amount of expenses constant in order to appreciate more easily the 









If the plaintiff is able to claim the entire amount of the attorney’s fee 
and costs as a deduction, presumably by allocating those amounts entirely 
to procuring taxable interest,123 she would still face federal tax liability of 
$538,300 (arising from the $1,935,000 of interest).124  On the other hand, 
if the plaintiff is able to deduct the attorney’s fees and costs only to the 
extent that the award or settlement is taxable,125 her deduction would be 
limited to thirty-nine percent of such costs because only thirty-nine 
percent ($1,935,000/$4,935,000) of the total recovery is taxable.   
Because of the operation of the AMT, this has no impact on the federal 
tax liability,126 but in most cases results in a significant increase in state 
                                                                                                                 
 123. This is an extremely unlikely, if not impossible, scenario, but one that demonstrates 
the limited utility of the deduction for the attorney’s fees and costs, even if fully available.  
 124. The 100% deductibility scenario is calculated as follows:  the plaintiff has 
$1,935,000 of interest income, which is also her adjusted gross income (“AGI”).  Her 
deductible expenses would be $2,200,000 of attorney’s fees and $300,000 of other litigation 
costs, which combined would be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $38,700, to 
$2,481,300.  When added to the $3,700 personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI 
are $2,485,000, resulting in a taxable income of ($550,000), obviously giving rise to no 
regular tax.  However, the AMT liability would be computed without the deduction for 
attorney’s fees and expenses.  The AMT exemption of $48,450 would be completely phased 
out and therefore the taxable excess would be $1,935,000 on which a tentative minimum tax 
of $538,300 would be due. 
 125. This approach is consistent with the Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1111 
n.8 (1983), formula for allocating deductible and non-deductible attorney’s fees.  See supra 
text accompanying note 113. 
 126. The thirty-nine percent deductibility scenario is calculated as follows:  the plaintiff 
still has $1,935,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI.  Her deductible expenses, 
however, would be $866,000 of attorney’s fees (approximately thirty-nine percent of 
$2,220,000 of fees paid) and $117,000 of other litigation costs (thirty-nine percent of 
$300,000 of other litigation costs paid), which combined would be reduced by two percent 
of her AGI, again $38,700, to $944,300.  When added to the $3,700 personal exemption, her 
Figure 2 




Recovery before taxes $2,415,000
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tax liability.127  Finally, if the plaintiff is only allowed to deduct the 
portion of the fees and costs that could be traced to work actually 
performed in furtherance of recovering taxable interest (under the origin-
of-the-claim doctrine), perhaps ten percent or less of the expenses could 
be deducted.  In other words, under the ten percent deductibility scenario, 
we are assuming that the plaintiff can only show that ten percent of the 
attorney’s fees and other litigation costs relate to the recovery of taxable 
interest, the remainder being disallowed as a deduction under § 212 
because it relates to the non-taxable income from the personal injury 
recovery.  The ten percent deductibility scenario results in only a slightly 
higher federal tax liability of $578,614.128  
 
                                                                                                                 
total deductions from AGI are $948,000, resulting in a taxable income of $987,000.  This 
taxable income gives rise to $322,764 of regular tax and $215,536 of alternative minimum 
tax, for a total of $538,300 in total federal income taxes. 
 127. Kansas does not have an alternative minimum tax.  In states like California that have 
an alternative minimum tax, this calculation would obviously be different.  CAL. REV. & 
TAX. CODE § 17062 (West 2010). 
 128. But note the significantly higher state tax liability of $110,432.  The ten percent 
deductibility scenario is calculated as follows:  the plaintiff still has $1,935,000 of interest 
income, which is also her AGI.  Her deductible expenses, however, would be $222,000 of 
attorney’s fees (ten percent of $2,220,000 of fees paid) and $30,000 of other litigation costs 
(ten percent of $300,000 of other litigation costs paid), which combined would be reduced 
by two percent of her AGI, again $38,700, to $213,300.  When added to the $3,700 personal 
exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $217,000, resulting in a taxable income of 
$1,718,000.  This taxable income gives rise to $578,614 of regular tax and no alternative 
minimum tax. 
Figure 3 
After 5 Years (Tax Impact)1 
 If 100% 
deductible 











$2,415,000 $2,415,000 $2,415,000 
Federal Tax $538,300  $538,300  $578,614 









Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
350 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:325 
 
 
After seven years, the award has grown to approximately $6,000,000 
due to accruing interest, which now is half of the award ($3,000,000 of 
$6,000,000).  Using the assumptions listed above, the successful plaintiff 
would now be liable for $2,700,000 of the attorney’s fees (forty-five 
percent of $6,000,000).  To account for two additional years of 
proceedings and filings, assume a modest increase in litigation expenses 











After seven years, the federal tax liability would be $836,500 if the fees 
and costs were either completely deductible129 or deductible to the extent 
of taxable recovery (fifty percent)130 and $940,269 if the expenses were 
only ten percent deductible.131  
                                                                                                                 
 129. The 100% deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff has 
$3,000,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses would be 
$2,700,000 of attorney’s fees and $350,000 of other litigation costs, which combined would 
be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $60,000, to $2,990,000. When added to the $3700 
personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $2,993,700, resulting in a taxable 
income of $6300, which gives rise to $630 of regular tax. However, the alternative minimum 
taxable income would be $3,000,000 (unreduced for personal exemptions or miscellaneous 
itemized deductions), which generates an alternative minimum tax of $835,870 and a total of 
$836,500 in federal income taxes. 
 130. The fifty percent deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff has 
$3,000,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses would be 
$1,350,000 of attorney’s fees (fifty percent of $2,700,000 of fees paid) and $175,000 of 
other litigation costs (fifty percent of $350,000 of other litigation costs paid), which 
combined would be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $60,000, to $1,465,000. When 
added to the $3700 personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $1,468,700, 
resulting in a taxable income of $1,531,300. This taxable income gives rise to $513,269 of 
regular tax. Again, the $3,000,000 of alternative minimum taxable income generates 
$323,231 of alternative minimum tax, for a total of $836,500 in total federal income taxes. 
 131. This scenario produces an even more significant variation of the state tax liability, 
up to $177,080. The ten percent deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff 
still has $3,000,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses 
Figure 4 
After 7 years: 
Gross Recovery $6,000,000 
Attorney’s Fee ($2,700,000) 
Costs  ($350,000)
Recovery before Taxes $2,950,000  
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Again, we arrive at this result because although compensation (whether 
by settlement or judgment) for personal injuries is excluded from 
income,132 interest earned or accrued with respect to such payments is not 
excludable from income.133  Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Commissioner v. Banks,134 even if a portion of the plaintiff’s award is 
payable directly to his or her attorney under a contingency fee 
arrangement, that amount is taxable to the plaintiff.135  While a taxpayer is 
allowed to deduct his or her attorney’s fees attributable to the taxable 
portion of the recovery,136 the deduction is a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction, limited to the amount that exceeds two percent of the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income,137 and will be subject to the AMT, 
which disallows the use of miscellaneous itemized deductions, including 
attorney’s fees, in computing the tax liability.138 
 
Figure 5 
After 7 Years (Tax Impact) 
 If 100% 
deductible 











before Taxes $2,950,000 $2,950,000 $2,950,000 
Federal Tax $836,500  $836,500 $940,269  
State Tax $271  $96,423  $177,080  
Net to 
Plaintiff $2,113,229 $2,017,077 $1,832,651  
 
                                                                                                                 
would be $270,000 of attorney’s fees (approximately ten percent of $2,700,000 of fees paid) 
and $35,000 of other litigation costs (ten percent of $350,000 of other litigation costs paid), 
which combined would be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $60,000, to $245,000. 
When added to the $3700 personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $248,700, 
resulting in a taxable income of $2,751,300. This taxable income gives rise to $940,269 of 
regular tax.  There is no alternative minimum tax liability under this scenario. 
 132. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(2010). 
 133. Id. § 61(a)(4). 
 134. 543 U.S. 426 (2005). 
 135. Id. at 430. 
 136. See I.R.C. § 212 (2006). 
 137. Id. § 67. 
 138. Id. § 56(b)(1)(A). 
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A few points are readily apparent when examining the life cycle of the 
hypothetical lawsuit involving a significant interest component.  Perhaps 
most important, the plaintiff benefits less than almost any other party as 
the lawsuit drags on through years of litigation.  Using the pro rata (thirty-
nine percent) deductibility scenario, the plaintiff’s net recovery grew by 
$463,417 (from $1,350,000 to $1,813,417) during the five years following 
the jury verdict, or approximately 34.33%.  During this same time, the 
IRS’s portion has increased from nothing (as the initial award was not 
taxable) to $538,300.  The attorney’s share has increased by $870,000 
(from $1,350,000 to $2,220,000), or 64.44%.  
Between years five and seven, still using the pro rata (now fifty 
percent) deductibility scenario, the plaintiff’s net recovery has increased 
only $203,660 (from $1,813,417 to $2,017,077), or approximately 
11.23%.  Of course, the plaintiff has had no access to the award or 
settlement funds in the meantime.  In contrast, the federal government’s 
take has increased by $298,200 (from $538,300 to $836,500), or 
approximately 55.40%.  Finally, the attorney’s portion has increased by 
$480,000 (from $2,220,000 to $2,700,000), or approximately 21.62%.  
In other words, after five years from the date of the jury award, under 
the pro rata (thirty-nine percent) deductibility scenario, the plaintiff is 
ultimately receiving only $463,417 of $1,935,000 of interest, or 
approximately twenty-four cents of every dollar of interest recovered.  
The federal government is getting approximately twenty-eight cents of 
every dollar of interest ($538,300 of $1,935,000) and the plaintiff’s 
attorney is entitled to approximately forty-five cents of every dollar of 
interest ($870,000 of $1,935,000).  Between years five and seven, the 
plaintiff is receiving approximately nineteen cents of every dollar of 
interest recovered ($203,660 of $1,065,000).  The IRS receives 
approximately twenty-eight cents of every dollar of interest ($298,200 of 
$1,065,000) and the plaintiff’s attorney retains approximately forty-five 
cents of every dollar of interest recovered ($480,000 of $1,065,000).   
During the seven year post-judgment period, the plaintiff is ultimately 
receiving only $667,077 of $3,000,000 of interest, or approximately 
twenty-two cents of every dollar of interest recovered.  The Treasury is 
getting approximately twenty-eight cents of every dollar of interest 
($836,500 of $3,000,000) and the plaintiff’s attorney maintains forty-five 
cents of every dollar of interest ($1,350,000 of $3,000,000).  
The results clarify the point that the plaintiff’s attorney and the federal 
government have much to gain from the lawsuit continuing for years 
while the plaintiff’s relative recovery steadily diminishes.  Clearly, the 
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policy served by post-judgment interest of making the plaintiff whole for 
injuries is not promoted in this context.  
Additionally, litigation strategy may be impacted by these tax results.  
While no one is suggesting that a plaintiff’s lawyer would intentionally 
drag out a personal injury recovery unnecessarily,139 a new and perhaps 
unnecessary strain on the attorney-client relationship is introduced when 
the economic interests of the parties are not in accord, if not at odds.140  
More likely, an astute defense counsel could suggest that it is in the 
plaintiff’s best interest to settle for a lesser amount than the jury award 
and accumulated interest early since the plaintiff will not be adequately 
compensated for the time value of money as the lawsuit drags on.  When 
the plaintiff ultimately nets twenty percent or less of the interest paid, 
while the IRS gets thirty percent and the plaintiff’s attorney continues to 
receive forty-five percent, the relative motivation for an informed plaintiff 
to settle earlier is obvious.  
III.  Previously Proposed Solutions to the Inclusion Problem 
Courts and tax scholars have previously addressed the tax issues 
presented by inclusion of the attorney’s portion of the plaintiff’s recovery 
in the plaintiff’s gross income, but have primarily focused on the wholly-
taxable award context.  Also, the solutions proposed have, for the most 
part, been foreclosed by the Banks decision or present significant 
conceptual or logistical hurdles.  This part addresses some of those 
proposals and examines their shortcomings in the partially non-taxable 
recovery context. 
A. Minority View Prior to Banks:  Contingent Fee Arrangement Results in 
Immediate Transfer of a Portion of the Claim to the Attorney 
One minority view in the circuit split that existed prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Banks141 characterized contingent fee 
arrangements as resulting in an immediate transfer of a portion of the 
                                                                                                                 
 139. The lawyer has an obvious incentive to settle as soon as possible to recover costs 
fronted for litigation and free up resources tied to the case. 
 140. Scholars have acknowledged a similar tension between the attorney’s interests and 
the interests of the client brought about by the alternative minimum tax trap.  Hellwig & 
Polsky, supra note 39, at 922 (“[B]ecause of the AMT trap, it may actually be in the 
plaintiff’s best interests to not petition for fees.  In contrast, it would obviously be in the 
attorney’s best interests for the plaintiff to file the petition, as it would increase his fees.”). 
 141. 543 U.S. 426 (2005). 
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plaintiff’s claim to the attorney.142  This was the position taken by the 
Ninth Circuit interpreting Oregon law in Banaitis v. Commissioner,143 
which was consolidated into the Supreme Court’s decision in Banks.144  In 
Banaitis, the Ninth Circuit held that “Oregon law vests attorneys with 
property interests that cannot be extinguished or discharged by the parties 
to the action except by payment to the attorney.”145   
The assignment or immediate transfer view appears to have originated 
with the 1959 Fifth Circuit case, Cotnam v. Commissioner,146 in which a 
plaintiff retained an attorney under a contingent fee arrangement to pursue 
a contract claim relating to a promise to provide for the plaintiff in a 
will.147  The Cotnam court relied upon an Alabama attorney’s lien law that 
provided that attorneys had the same “right and power” over suits and 
judgments to enforce their liens as their clients.148  In this sense, the court 
determined that “[a]ttorneys have the same rights as their clients[,]” and 
accordingly, “[u]nder Alabama law, [the plaintiff] could never have 
received the [the attorney’s portion of the recovery], even if she had 
settled the case directly with the Bank.”149  Therefore, “[t]his sum was 
income to the attorneys but not to [the client].”150 
Likewise, in Foster v. United States,151 the Eleventh Circuit found it 
inappropriate to tax the plaintiff on amounts due immediately to her 
attorney under a contingency fee arrangement.  In that case, “[a]fter the 
jury verdict, but before an appeal was filed, Foster negotiated with her 
attorneys that, if they represented her on appeal, they could take all of the 
post-judgment interest, if any, rather than just the half they were entitled 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Jackson, supra note 41, at 69-72.  See generally Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 
1275 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled by Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005); Davis v. 
Comm’r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 
(6th Cir. 2000); Cotnam v. Comm’r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959), overruled by Comm’r v. 
Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005).  
 143. 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005); see 
supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 144. 543 U.S. at 431.  
 145. 340 F.3d at 1083 (emphasis added). 
 146. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 147. Id. at 120-21, 125. 
 148. Id. at 125 (citing 46 ALA. CODE § 64 (1940)). 
 149. Id. (citing Denson v. Ala. Fuel & Iron Co., 73 So. 525 (Ala. 1916); W. Ry. of Ala. v. 
Foshee, 62 So. 500 (Ala. 1913)).  
 150. Id. at 125. 
 151. 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled by Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 
(2005). 
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to based on the pre-trial contingency fee agreement.”152  The Eleventh 
Circuit refused to look simply to the assignment of income doctrine, and 
instead found the arrangement “more like a division of property than an 
assignment of income.”153  
Professors Brant Hellwig and Greg Polsky have published extensively 
in the areas of taxation of litigation expenses, the alternative minimum tax 
(“AMT”) implications on awards, and structuring settlements from a tax 
perspective.154  Their 2004 article, Litigation Expenses and the Alternative 
Minimum Tax,155 described the AMT trap that faces successful litigants 
and evaluated the then-current arguments and proposals for ameliorating 
the effects of the AMT on recoveries.156  Hellwig and Polsky criticized the 
immediate transfer approach taken by the pre-Banks minority circuits, 
arguing against construing the contingent fee arrangement as an 
immediate transfer of anything for tax purposes.157  Instead, in their view, 
the contingent arrangement was merely a promise to pay on the part of the 
plaintiff upon disposition of the claim.158  In that case, the plaintiff would 
include the entire recovery in gross income and then deduct the fees once 
paid.159  Further, even if the contingent fee arrangement were deemed an 
immediate transfer, tax law would still require inclusion and deduction.160  
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 1279. 
 153. Id. at 1280 (quoting Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58 (6th 
Cir. 2000)).  
 154. See, e.g., Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39; Hellwig, supra note 75; Gregg D. 
Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing Structured Settlements, 51 B.C. L. REV. 39 (2010). 
 155. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39. 
 156. Id. at 901-02, 912-21, 931-38. 
 157. Id. at 906-07. 
 158. Id. at 906. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 907-08; Jackson, supra note 41, at 95. 
The granddaddy of those cases, Cotnam v. Commissioner, supra, a 2-1 opinion 
(so far as relates to the issue in our case) with Judge Wisdom dissenting, states 
its rationale as follows:  ‘The amount of the contingent fee was earned, and 
well earned, by the attorneys.  True, in a remote rather than a proximate sense, 
the entire amount of the judgment had also been earned by Mrs. Cotnam, but 
she could never have collected anything or have enjoyed any economic benefit 
unless she had employed attorneys, and to do so, she had to part with forty per 
cent of her claim long before the realization of any income from it.’  263 F.2d 
at 126.  This rationale badly flunks the test of neutral principles.  It is often the 
case that to obtain income from an asset one must hire a skilled agent and pay 
him up front; that expense is a deductible expense, not an exclusion from 
income. 
Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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Code § 83 would govern the transfer in connection with services, and 
because the lawyer’s interest would be “subject to a substantial risk of 
forfeiture” until liquidation of the claim, the tax consequences would be 
held in abeyance until the risk of forfeiture lapsed (i.e., upon 
liquidation).161  At liquidation, however, the plaintiff would realize gain 
on the disposition of the attorney’s portion of the claim.162  
Another concern with the immediate transfer approach is whether an 
attorney could ethically receive a property interest in the underlying cause 
of action.163  The immediate interest transfer approach relies in large part 
on state attorney lien laws, which can give an attorney a priority creditor 
status with respect to litigation proceeds.164  When this priority is 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 907. 
 162. Id.  
A brief consideration of the tax ramifications of treating a plaintiff who is party 
to a contingent fee agreement as realizing the benefit of the attorney's services 
upon assigning a portion of the claim proceeds to the attorney illustrates the 
fallacy of treating the fee agreement as effecting a present assignment of 
anything for tax purposes.  It is far more likely that the plaintiff and attorney 
each viewed the fee agreement as memorializing the plaintiff's conditional 
promise to compensate the attorney based on a predetermined formula, a 
characterization which would not yield tax consequences unless and until the 
attorney was actually paid the contingent fee.  Furthermore, this must have 
been what the Court had in mind in Banks, as it regarded the taxpayers as 
realizing gross income from the payment of their attorney's fees in the year of 
payment . . . .  Specifically, the Court did not view the fee agreement as 
effecting a completed assignment, but rather as constituting a promise to pay in 
the future.  This leap of faith negates the relevance of the assignment of income 
doctrine to the transaction.  This reconciliation of the Banks decision seems 
appropriate, as the assignment of income doctrine is best understood as an 
equitable doctrine to be used to attribute gratuitously assigned income to the 
assignor when necessary to achieve a reasonable and fair imposition of the tax 
burden. 
Hellwig, supra note 75, at 789-90 (citations omitted). 
 163. See Jackson, supra note 41, at 123 (noting ethical concerns arising from the 
assignment of income doctrine and stating that treating lawyers and their clients as partners 
undermines a lawyer’s objectivity, independence and the obligation to act as an agent of the 
client for the exclusive benefit of the client); Reece, supra note 21, at 332-33. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33. 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Banks, several United States circuit 
courts in their discussions of whether or not to include contingent attorney fees 
in the taxpayer's gross income had included in their opinions the effect of state 
attorney lien statutes.  As described in Estate of Clarks, the common law 
attorney's lien is unlike ‘any other lien known to the law’ because it creates a 
property right in the judgment without the attorney having possession of the 
judgment awarded.  ‘It is a peculiar lien, to be enforced by peculiar methods.’  
In fact, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
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construed as a property interest such that it removes the portion of the 
recovery paid directly to the attorney from the plaintiff’s taxable income, 
one can legitimately question the propriety of the arrangement.165  If the 
attorney actually acquires a portion of the underlying cause of action, 
even with diminished rights to the ultimate disposition of such a property 
interest, the attorney may run afoul of the letter, if not the intent, of the 
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”).166  
MRPC 1.8 provides that an attorney “shall not acquire a proprietary 
interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is 
conducting for a client.”167  The attorney may, however, “acquire a lien 
authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and . . . contract 
with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.”168  Although 
the model rule clearly allows the attorney to contract with the client for a 
contingent fee, which is precisely the arrangement at issue, any attempt to 
construe the relationship or the relative ownership of the property (i.e., the 
cause of action) as something beyond a contingent promise to pay is at 
least arguably in conflict with the attorney’s ethical responsibility to 
refrain from interfering with the client’s proprietary rights in the action.169  
Given this ethical framework, it may be wise for lawyers to avoid future 
attempts to persuade courts that their rights in the case exceed anything 
other than those of a priority creditor.  
Another practical consideration regarding the attempt to adopt an 
immediate transfer approach to the contingent fee arrangement is that 
reliance on state attorney lien statutes requires a state-by-state analysis170 
                                                                                                                 
Raymond even went so far as to say that ‘to the extent that most courts to 
consider the issue have indicated that the analysis of state law is determinative, 
this is perhaps not a true ‘circuit split.’’ 
Jennifer J. Loomis, The Taxation of Contingent Attorney Fees: Did the Supreme Court 
Correctly Decide Commissioner v. Banks?, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 115, 148 (2006) (citations 
omitted). 
 165. See Reece, supra note 21, at 332 (“[A]ssignment of a legal interest to an attorney 
handling that interest as the client's agent, carries unmistakable ethical twists,” and 
“‘[a]lthough the rules of ethics require attorneys to zealously advocate for their clients, 
allowing an attorney to become a ‘partner’ in a client's cause of action creates ethical 
problems.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Bernard J. Grant, III, No Taxation Without 
Realization: Srivastava v. Commissioner, The Fifth Circuit’s Answer to Tax Treatment of 
Attorney’s Fees Under a Contingency Agreement, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 363, 376 (2001)).  
 166. Id. at 332-33. 
 167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2011). 
 168. Id. 1.8(i)(1)-(2). 
 169. See Reece, supra note 21, at 333-34. 
 170. See id. at 319-20 (“[I]ncome to a particular taxpayer depends strictly on state law 
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and produces disparate results depending on the exact wording of a state’s 
particular law.171  It is beyond question that property rights and the 
priority of an attorney/creditor are primarily determined under state 
law.172  It is also clear that minor distinctions in a state’s attorney lien 
statute can produce dramatically different assessments of the relative 
rights of the attorney and client with respect to the underlying cause of 
action.173  For example, the Ninth Circuit in Banaitis found Oregon 
attorney lien law unique: 
                                                                                                                 
definition of property or property interests.  The Cotnam court and others argued that state 
statutes creating attorney’s liens actually create a proprietary interest in the claim.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 171. Id. at 331 (“The interpretations of state equitable lien statutes create a serious 
problem of non-uniformity in the taxation of awards to clients.”). 
 172. The Ninth Circuit in Banaitis v. Commissioner viewed the question of whether the 
attorney’s portion of a recovery under a contingency fee agreement should be included as 
part of the plaintiff’s gross income as a two-part inquiry:  “(1) how state law defines the 
attorney’s rights in the action, and (2) how federal law operates in light of this state law 
definition of interests.”  340 F.3d 1074, 1081 (2003) (citations omitted), reversed by 
Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005); see Reece, supra note 21, at 326 (“The attorney lien 
which is important for the discussion herein is the ‘charging lien.’  An attorney’s charging 
lien is a common law, sometimes a statutory, equitable lien, like a mechanic's lien.”); see 
also Thad Austin Davis, Cotnam v. Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment of 
Contingency–Based Attorneys’ Fees  The Alabama Attorney’s Charging Lien Meets Lucas 
v. Earl Head-On, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683, 1688, 1690 (2000) (“The attorney’s charging lien 
exists in both statutory and common law form. . . .  The charging lien often has priority over 
other liens and can even take priority over a defendant's right of setoff.”). 
 173. Reece explains:  
In a state where an attorney’s lien is interpreted as an equitable property 
interest, the courts could view the contingent fee agreement as an assignment of 
property right . . . and hold that part of the award is not taxable to the client.  In 
a state where an attorney’s lien is deemed a security interest, the anticipatory 
assignment of income doctrine will require clients to pay taxes on the full 
amount of the award because attorney lien statutes in those states are 
interpreted to provide no proprietary right in the claim. 
Reece, supra note 21, at 331-32; see also Jackson, supra note 41, at 81-82 (“The court 
agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Srivastava, that ‘the answer [as to whether to 
apply Cotnam] does not depend on the intricacies of an attorney's bundle of rights against 
the opposing party under the law of the governing state.’  The court recognized that such a 
state-by-state approach would not provide uniformity of result in tax consequences 
throughout the country.” (alteration in original) (quoting Banks v. Comm’r, 345 F.3d 373, 
386 (6th Cir. 2003)); Reece, supra note 21, at 330 (“First, the dependence upon state 
interpretation of attorney lien statutes creates a lack of uniformity between the states and 
may violate the Constitutional pronouncement of uniformity in taxation.”). 
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Oregon law . . . affords attorneys generous property interests in 
judgments and settlements. . . .  Put simply, Oregon law vests 
attorneys with property interests that cannot be extinguished or 
discharged by the parties to the action except by payment to the 
attorney. . . .  Because of the unique features of Oregon law, we 
conclude that fees paid directly to [the attorney] were not 
includable in Banaitis’ gross income for the relevant year.174 
Moreover, courts analyzing state lien statutes would likely make a wide 
range of determinations of these relative rights and as a result, lend great 
uncertainty to the plaintiff’s tax situation for a number of years until a 
consensus could be reached by the courts or uniform laws enacted.  More 
importantly, there remains a serious question about whether there is any 
substantive distinction among the state attorney lien laws or whether, 
instead, the “economic reality facing the taxpayer-plaintiff” is not 
meaningfully affected.175  
Although many of these issues were not directly addressed by the 
Supreme Court in Banks, the ruling in Banks, relying on the anticipatory 
assignment of income doctrine to place the income initially in the 
plaintiff’s hands for tax purposes, forecloses the immediate transfer 
argument for the foreseeable future.176  Those seeking aid for plaintiffs 
shouldering the tax burden of the attorney’s share of their recovery will 
have to look elsewhere for a realistic possibility of relief. 
B. Attacking the Use of the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine 
The majority of circuit courts177 prior to Commissioner v. Banks, and 
ultimately the Supreme Court in Banks, required the plaintiff to include 
the recovery in whole and then take a deduction for the amounts paid to 
the attorney pursuant to the contingent fee arrangement.178  These courts 
relied, to one degree or another, on the anticipatory assignment of income 
                                                                                                                 
 174. 340 F.3d at 1082-83.  Similar state law specific determinations were made applying 
Alabama law in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959), and Foster v. 
United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 175. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 910 (quoting Srvivasava v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 
353, 364 (2000)). 
 176. 543 U.S. 426, 435 (2005) (“In the case of a litigation recovery the income-
generating asset is the cause of action that derives from the plaintiff’s legal injury.  The 
plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout the litigation.”). 
 177. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 178. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430, 434. 
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doctrine enunciated in Lucas v. Earl179 and applied to income from 
property in Helvering v. Horst.180  In 2004, Hellwig and Polsky argued 
that the majority view of the circuits at that time inappropriately applied 
the assignment of income doctrine to arm’s-length commercial 
transactions like contingent fee arrangements.181  This position was 
reiterated in Professor Leah Witcher Jackson’s 2005 article, Won the 
Legal Battle, but at What Tax Costs to Your Client: Tax Consequences of 
Contingency Fee Arrangements Leading up to and After Commissioner v. 
Banks.182  In her article, Jackson explored the inclusion and deductibility 
landscape immediately following the Banks decision.183  According to 
Jackson, because the contingent fee agreement is an arm’s-length 
agreement, with the attorney using her skill, training, and expertise to earn 
a portion of the award, the shift of income cannot be considered to be 
gratuitous and thus does not fall under the umbrella of the anticipatory 
assignment of income doctrine.184  
Hellwig revisited this position following the Banks decision in 2006 
and again concluded that the assignment of income doctrine was 
inappropriately applied outside of the gratuitous transfer context.185  
Hellwig noted that a significant justification for applying the assignment 
of income doctrine rests on preventing taxpayers from undermining the 
progressive tax system through intra-family or otherwise friendly 
                                                                                                                 
 179. 281 U.S. 111 (1929); see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.  The Supreme 
Court first invoked the assignment of income doctrine in the context of an arm’s-length 
transaction in United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 447 (1973).  See Hellwig, supra note 75, 
at 795-96. 
 180. 311 U.S. 112 (1940); see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
 181. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 908-09 (describing the majority view in which 
the courts determined that contingent fee arrangements transferred only the right to the 
proceeds of the attorney’s fee portion of the recovery, and not that portion of the recovery, 
and noting that because this would be a transfer of “income” rather than a transfer of 
“property,” the transfer would be wholly ignored under the assignment of income doctrine 
and instead taxed entirely to the plaintiff, who could then possibly deduct her costs to 
produce the income). 
 182. Jackson, supra note 41. 
 183. Id. at 102-05. 
 184. Id. at 102.  
 185. Hellwig, supra note 75, at 780-81; see also Reece, supra note 21, at 315 (citing 
Kathryn J. Ball, Horizontal Equity and the Tax Consequences of Attorney-Client Fee 
Agreements, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 406 (2001); Stanislava B. Kimball, Explaining a Circuit 
Split: Contingency Fees May Constitute Clients’ Gross Income Depending on Whether the 
State Law Permits the Assignment of a Cause of Action to Create a Property Ownership 
Interest, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 583 (2002)). 
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transactions.186  Without the existence of this tax rate contravention 
motivation in arm’s-length transactions, the normal principles of income 
realization should be applied, and there is no need to assert the assignment 
of income doctrine.187  Indeed, in Professor Hellwig’s view, Banks 
expands the assignment of income doctrine to property transactions far 
beyond the original utility of the doctrine and obfuscates the transactional 
analysis of taxpayers in otherwise bona fide and straightforward 
arrangements.188  
Notwithstanding this criticism, it is clear that in the wake of Banks, the 
Supreme Court will now view a contingent fee arrangement between an 
attorney and a client as an anticipatory assignment of income,189 with the 
result that the plaintiff will be unable to exclude from income the 
attorney’s portion of a taxable award or payment.190  This again suggests 
that a legislative solution will be necessary in order to provide plaintiffs 
with relief from the tax burden resulting from inclusion of the attorney’s 
contingent share of the recovery in the plaintiff’s taxable income.  
C. Other Approaches 
1. Partnership or Joint Venture 
Another approach cited in the plaintiff’s argument in the Banks case 
was to treat the contingent attorney fee arrangement as a type of 
partnership agreement or joint venture.191  This argument suggests that in 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Hellwig, supra note 75, at 772-73. 
 187. Id.; see also Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing Confusion 
Over the Assignment of Income Doctrine and Personal Service Income, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 
623, 633 (1993) (“The vice of a gratuitous assignment of income is that, if respected for tax 
purposes, it would enable the assignor to shift the incidence of tax on the assigned income to 
one or more other taxpayers. . . .  If, however, the assignor assigns his earned income for full 
and adequate consideration, that is, if he ‘sells’ his right to the earned income for its full 
value, the incidence of taxation will not be shifted since the taxpayer will receive, and report 
as taxable income, one dollar for every dollar of income he assigns.  Since the vice which 
the doctrine seeks to prevent does not exist in this case, there is no reason to apply the 
doctrine.”). 
 188. Hellwig, supra note 75, at 781-82.  The assignment of income doctrine’s original 
purpose was to “plug[] statutory gaps” in the I.R.C. and provide guidance to parties as to 
which should report income in ambiguous situations.  Id. at 781. 
 189. 543 U.S. 426, 434 (2005). 
 190. Black, Black & Black, supra note 72, at 1 (“The Supreme Court said that the 
income-generating asset is the cause of action.  The full value of the recovery from the cause 
of action will be included in the taxpayers’ income under the assignment of income 
doctrine.”). 
 191. Id. at 436 (“We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client relationship 
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agreeing to the contingent fee contract, the plaintiff enters into a 
partnership or joint venture with the attorney in which the attorney 
contributes services and the plaintiff contributes a portion of either the 
cause of action itself or the ultimate recovery.  If this arrangement is 
indeed a partnership under Subchapter K of the I.R.C., then the plaintiff’s 
contribution of property (the cause of action) in exchange for a 
partnership interest and the attorney’s contribution of services in 
exchange for a partnership interest would be initially tax-free under Code 
§ 721.192  At the point when the cause of action, combined with the 
attorney’s services, is reduced to a cash judgment, the income would be 
allocated among the partners in accordance with the partnership 
agreement (i.e., the contingency fee) according to Code § 704(a).193  That 
is, the attorney would be allocated her portion of the recovery for tax 
purposes, and the plaintiff would not be subject to tax on the attorney’s 
portion.194  The Sixth Circuit favorably referenced this view, among 
others, in its holding for the taxpayer in the portion of Banks that was 
ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court from that circuit.195  Hellwig 
and Polsky reviewed this argument in 2004 and found that this approach 
leads quickly back to Code § 83, as a transfer of property in exchange for 
services similar to those approaches discussed above.196  
Perhaps an even simpler analysis could dispose of this argument.  
According to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (“RUPA”), a 
“partnership” is “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit.”197  It strains reason to construe as “profit” 
the award or settlement that a plaintiff and her attorney are seeking to 
                                                                                                                 
as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes.”). 
 192. Id. at 437; see also I.R.C. § 721(a) (2006) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized to a 
partnership or to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the 
partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership.”); Brief for the Respondent at 15-
16, Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (No.03-892). 
 193. Brief for the Respondent Banaitis at 5, Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (No. 
03-907), 2004 WL 183536; Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 913. 
 194. I.R.C. § 704(a); Brief for the Respondent Banaitis, supra note 193, at 5-6.  
 195. Banks v. Comm’r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing to that court’s earlier 
findings in Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58 (6th Cir. 2000)) (“[W]e 
found other factors persuasive in distinguishing contingency fees from Lucas and Horst, 
including . . . taxpayer’s claim was like a partnership or joint venture in which the taxpayer 
assigned away one-third in hope of recovering two-thirds.”), reversed by Comm’r v. Banks, 
543 U.S. 426 (2005). 
 196. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 913-14. 
 197. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997). 
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recover in a personal injury lawsuit.  Even the interest component of such 
an award, which is taxable, could not easily be construed as a “profit” in 
any usual or legal sense of the term.198  The policy behind most post-
judgment and other interest payments is to compensate the recipient for 
the lost time value of the money that has been awarded.199  It is difficult to 
construe as a venture for “profit” a partnership whose sole business 
purpose is to recover amounts that compensate a plaintiff for a personal 
injury or address a deferred economic entitlement.  
Similarly, the Code defines a partnership as “a syndicate, group, pool, 
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means 
of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on.”200  
Again, two parties working together to recover compensatory damages 
and even interest resulting from harm done to one of the parties could 
hardly be construed as a business or financial operation.201  Perhaps such 
an endeavor could be considered a “venture,” but not in any traditional 
sense of the term.  It is clear that the arrangement between a personal 
injury plaintiff and her attorney under a contingency fee contract would 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See Bradley T. Borden, Taxing Shared Economies of Scale, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 721, 
755 (2009).  Although Professor Borden examines the definition of “profit” in the tax 
definition context, he explores the broader meaning and origins of the term: 
Three potential definitions of profit exist: (1) an accounting definition, (2) a 
balance sheet definition, and (3) a dictionary definition.  The accounting 
definition of profits is “net income, or the difference between revenues and 
expenses, for a given accounting period.” . . .  The balance sheet definition 
refers to profits as money that remains after a partnership pays all liabilities and 
returns partner contributions. . . .  The dictionary definition is the “benefit or 
advantage accruing from the management, use, or sale of property from the 
carrying on of any process of production, or from the conduct of business.”   
Id. at 755-56 (citations omitted) (quoting City of Englewood v. Commercial Union 
Assurance Cos., 940 P.2d 948, 957 (Colo. App. 1996), which utilized the definition of profit 
set forth in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as “[a]n advantage, benefit, 
accession of good, gain, or valuable return especially in financial matters. . . . [a] benefit or 
advantage accruing from the management, use, or sale of property from the carrying on of 
any process of production, or from the conduct of business.”)).  All of these definitions seem 
to imply some sort of gain or advantage from the starting point and not merely restitution.  
 199. See supra Part II.A.; see, e.g., Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d 752, 756 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (“The purpose of awarding interest to a party recovering a money judgment is, of 
course, to compensate the wronged person for being deprived of the monetary value of the 
loss from the time of the loss to the payment of the money judgment.”). 
 200. I.R.C. § 761 (2006).  
 201. See generally, Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 925, 984-91 (2006) (describing the joint-profit motive required for 
recognition of a tax partnership under federal law). 
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not be a business or tax law partnership even from a platonic or 
definitional perspective.  
The partnership or joint venture approach raises some of the same 
ethical considerations as the concept of an immediate transfer of a 
property interest in the cause of action to the plaintiff’s attorney upon 
entering into the contingent fee arrangement.202  In theory, perhaps it is 
possible that one partner could retain control of the ultimate disposition 
over the properties of the partnership while the other partner merely 
contributes services and waits for a potential distribution of cash from the 
partnership.  That view, however, represents a terribly strained 
understanding of the attorney-client relationship (the typical principal-
agent relationship as discussed below) and presents a host of challenges to 
identifying the actual parameters of the respective contributions, rights, 
and duties of the “partners.” 
 Further, while listing Subchapter K treatment of the contingent fee 
arrangement among those theories of exclusion that must be developed 
further by lower courts, the Supreme Court in Banks all but foreclosed 
this path elsewhere in its opinion.203  Although no intent is necessary to 
create a partnership, the principal difference between the partnership or 
joint venture and the attorney-client relationship is that the client 
maintains ultimate control over the case at all times.204  Indeed, the 
attorney-client relationship, in the words of the Court, is the 
“quintessential principal-agent relationship.”205  In the Court’s view, 
“[t]he attorney is an agent who is duty-bound to act only in the interests of 
the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the full amount of the 
recovery as income to the principal.”206  The Court also cited Judge 
Posner’s observation that “‘the contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint 
owner of his client’s claim in the legal sense any more than the 
commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer’s accounts 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See Jackson, supra note 41, at 123; Reece, supra note 21, at 330 (“Second, attorneys 
taking an ownership interest in the claim is a per se violation of the ethical rules of 
professional conduct.”). 
 203. Jackson, supra note 41, at 119, 123.  
 204. Id. at 123 (“In an attorney-client relationship, the client maintains control.  The 
attorney may take certain steps on behalf of the client; however, the client maintains ultimate 
control over the critical decisions, more like a principal-agent relationship than partners.” 
(citing Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§§ 13, 39, 387 (1957)))). 
 205. Banks, 543 U.S. at 436.  
 206. Id.  
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receivable.’”207  Accordingly, “the [p]ortion paid to the agent may be 
deductible, but absent some other provision of law it is not excludable 
from the principal’s gross income.”208  This language leaves little doubt 
that a partnership or joint venture approach is far from adoption in the 
highest level of the judiciary. 
2. Transaction Cost  
The Banks decision also specifically declined to address a theory in 
which litigation recoveries are viewed as proceeds from the disposition of 
property under Code §§ 1001, 1012, and 1016.209  This approach was 
advocated by Jackson in her 2005 article.210  The transactional cost 
approach views the attorney’s fee as a cost incurred in the realization of 
the income from the claim, which allows the individual taxpayer to pay 
taxes only on what she actually realized.211  The Seventh Circuit in 
Kenseth v. Commissioner212 applied a transactional-cost method.213  
Jackson analogized this approach to that followed for securities vending 
in Treasury Regulation § 1.263(a)-2(e), which specifically allows for the 
offset of commissions against the selling price.214  
 According to Jackson, “[a]pplication of the transactional-cost theory 
begins with the recognition that [a] client’s claim is . . . property[,]” 
which has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Banks.215  The 
amount realized would be offset by the basis, which would be adjusted for 
the costs and expenditures connected to the claim.216  The plaintiff in this 
situation would be analogous to a seller of a block of stock or parcel of 
real estate.  In both of these situations, the seller is allowed to offset the 
proceeds with the costs incurred to produce those proceeds.217  According 
to Jackson, the transactional-cost or capital-cost method would be 
equitable and would ensure that the parties pay tax just on what they have 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Id. at 436-37 (alteration in original) (quoting Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 883 
(7th Cir. 2001)). 
 208. Id. at 437. 
 209. Id. at 437-38. 
 210. Jackson, supra note 41, at 126. 
 211. Id.  
 212. 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).  
 213. Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883; Jackson, supra note 41, at 126. 
 214. Jackson, supra note 41, at 127. 
 215. Id. at 129. 
 216. Id. at 130. 
 217. Id. at 130-31. 
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earned.218  Finally, she argued that the approach would work equally well 
for hourly and contingency fees and suggested that application of the 
transactional cost approach would make changes to § 62(a) 
unnecessary.219 
Although Hellwig and Polksy agreed that this approach is sound from a 
policy standpoint and would produce an equitable result for the plaintiff, 
they determined that “there simply exists too much established doctrine 
standing in its way.”220  This position was articulated earlier in Alexander 
v. IRS,221 in which the court found that the Code simply does not provide 
for the offsetting of basis in cases where a litigant sues to recover his due 
compensation, except in limited circumstances involving capital assets.222  
Instead, the Code provides for deductions for such litigation expenses.  
Accepting the transaction cost argument, according to Hellwig and 
Polsky, would not only entail overturning court-made doctrine, “it would 
[] require either ignoring or marginalizing Treas. Reg. Section 1.212-
1(k)223 . . . and would override settled expectations of those taxpayers who 
pay their business-related litigation costs by the hour.”224 
                                                                                                                 
 218. Id. at 133-34. 
 219. Id. at 134. 
 220. Hellwig & Polksy, supra note 39, at 921. 
 221. 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 222. Id. at 944. 
 223. “Expenses paid or incurred in defending or perfecting title to property, in recovering 
property (other than investment property and amounts of income which, if and when 
recovered, must be included in gross income) . . .  constitute a part of the cost of the property 
and are not deductible expenses.” Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) (as amended in 1975). 
 224. Hellwig & Polksy, supra note 39, at 921.  The 2004 Hellwig and Polsky article 
wraps up with an analysis of Section 62(a)(19) (now (a)(20)) as adopted at the time: 
The need to correct the improper tax treatment of legal fees exists for all cases 
that are currently subject to the AMT trap – not just those relating to unlawful 
discrimination or broader claims arising in the employment context.  There is 
no justifiable reason why legal fees paid or incurred to prosecute claims for 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or punitive damages 
should be relegated to the status of miscellaneous itemized deductions that are 
subject to complete disallowance under the AMT.  Accordingly, the AMT trap 
should be corrected for all possible situations in which it would otherwise arise.  
This could be accomplished rather easily by amending section 62(a) to add to 
its list of above-the-line deductions the following:  deductions allowed under 
sections 162 or 212 which consist of expenses paid or incurred in connection 
with the prosecution of a cause of action. 
Id. at 938-39.  I am essentially advocating an expansion of this solution, directed instead at 
the taxable components of otherwise non-taxable awards.  
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Suffice it to say that each of these approaches presents unique and 
troublesome implementation issues, not the least of which is overcoming 
the Supreme Court’s edict in Banks. 
IV.  Potential Legislative Solutions 
In light of the Supreme Court’s application of the anticipatory 
assignment of income doctrine to the contingent fee arrangement in 
Commissioner v. Banks and its refusal to adopt any of the novel attempts 
to re-characterize the attorney-client relationship advocated by the 
taxpayers in Banks, a legislative solution to overtaxing plaintiffs may be 
the only possibility for fulfilling the policy of making injured plaintiff’s 
whole.225  A statutory revision could provide the successful plaintiff in 
partially non-taxable cases (e.g., personal injury and sickness cases) with 
the ability to either exclude or deduct above-the-line taxable portions of 
the recovery which are paid to her attorney as well as court costs.226  This 
approach would eliminate any need to resort to a state-by-state analysis of 
attorney lien statutes in order to determine what property interests, if any, 
the attorney had in a cause of action.  It would likewise foreclose the 
potential for ethical questions that could be raised as a result of construing 
the attorney’s lien as a property interest or anything beyond merely a 
grant of preferred creditor status.227  A legislative solution would also 
remove from the domain of the judiciary the responsibility for identifying 
unique property rights or otherwise implementing creative theories 
designed to avoid the arguably unjust result of taxing clients on their 
attorney’s share of the gross recovery.  Without the need to allow these 
theories to work their way through the judiciary, a statutory approach 
provides for immediate and consistent implementation and, most 
importantly, for predictable results for litigants and their advisors. 
A. Additional Deduction under Code § 212 
Code § 212 provides for a deduction of expenses incurred in 
connection with the production or collection of income.228  The 
Regulations interpreting § 212 explain that this deduction will not be 
available when the income produced is not taxable:  “[N]o deduction is 
                                                                                                                 
 225. 543 U.S. 426, 434-37 (2005). 
 226. Others previously have suggested or evaluated similar legislative solutions at 
various times.  See, e.g., Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 931-38; Jackson, supra note 
41, at 133-34; Reece, supra note 21, at 338-42. 
 227. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text. 
 228. I.R.C. § 212(1) (2006). 
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allowable under section 212 for any amount allocable to the 
production . . . of income which [is] not includible in gross 
income . . . .”229  Further, I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) states that “[n]o deduction 
shall be allowed for . . . [a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction 
which is allocable to one or more classes of income . . . wholly exempt 
from the taxes imposed by this subtitle . . . .”230  Accordingly, a special 
provision would be required to allow for the deduction for expenses paid 
(including attorney’s fees and court costs) with respect to the recovery of 
non-taxable amounts.  Below is a suggested revised Code § 212, which 
would provide such a deduction for cases involving personal injury or 
sickness (i.e., excludable under Code § 104(a)), but only to the extent that 
the claim produces taxable interest or punitive damages.  This limit would 
prevent the deduction of attorney’s fees and costs when none of the 
recovery is taxable, and therefore, the issue of overtaxing a litigant is not 
in play.  
Sample Revised § 212:  
Section 212: Expenses for the Production of Income. In the case of 
an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year —  
(1) For the production or collection of income; 
(2) For the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held 
for the production of income;  
(3) In connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any 
tax; or 
(4) For the production or collection of amounts received in any action 
involving a claim whose recovery is excluded from gross income under 
Section 104(a), but only to the extent that such claim results in recovery 
of taxable interest. 
Two simple examples demonstrate how this provision would apply: 
Example A: If X is awarded $3,000,000 compensatory damages 
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a) for personal injury and $1,500,000 in 
taxable interest, and X pays $2,000,000 in attorney’s fees and court costs, 
X would be allowed a deduction in the amount of $1,500,000.  
Example B: If X is awarded $5,000,000 compensatory non-taxable 
damages and $500,000 in taxable interest and pays $200,000 to attorney 
under an hourly fee arrangement, X would be allowed a $200,000 
deduction. 
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Obviously, § 265 would have to be revised to reflect any changes 
allowing deductions. This could be done with a simple preface to § 265 
stating “[e]xcept as provided in Section 212 . . . .”    To complete the 
circle, Code § 62 would have to be revised as well to make the deduction 
an above-the-line deduction, which would be available notwithstanding 
the application of the AMT.  This revision is almost identical to the 
language added by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,231 which 
provided a useable deduction for recovering plaintiffs in certain 
employment and civil rights cases. 
Sample Addition to § 62(a): 
Section 62(a) General Rule.  . . . the term “adjusted gross income” 
means, in the case of an individual, gross income minus the following 
deductions . . . (20) Any deduction allowable under this chapter for 
attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in 
connection with any action involving a claim described in 212(4) . . . .” 
Of course, even if limited, this approach does not offer a perfect 
parallel for the expenses incurred to recover taxable interest or punitive 
damages.  In effect, it allows offsetting of taxable amounts related to non-
taxable amounts to the extent that expenses are incurred, whether directly 
attributable to the taxable or non-taxable recovery.  Such an offset of 
taxable and non-taxable amounts could potentially run afoul of generally 
accepted accounting principles and could provide opportunities for abuse.  
However, because a similar revision232 was previously enacted to alleviate 
the problem of overtaxing recoveries in certain employment and civil 
rights cases, at least some variation of the modified above-the-line 
deduction for attorney’s fees and costs could be politically viable. 
B. Alternative Approach:  a New Exclusion 
Alternatively, a different legislative approach could partially nullify the 
use of the assignment of income doctrine as applied in Banks to certain 
contingent fee arrangements:  simply add a new exclusion for amounts 
that would be includable as a result of the Banks case in otherwise non-
taxable settings.  This would require perhaps a new Code section, which is 
drafted below as Code § 105 and is intended to address personal injury or 
sickness recoveries excludable under Code § 104(a): 
                                                                                                                 
 231. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
370 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:325 
 
 
[New] Section 105. Attorneys’ fees incurred with respect to 
certain recoveries.  Gross income does not include amounts 
recovered, including interest, by a taxpayer in connection with 
any action involving a claim the recovery of which is excluded 
from gross income under I.R.C. Section 104(a), but only to the 
extent of attorney’s fees or court costs paid by, or on behalf of, 
a taxpayer in connection with such action. 
Although neither of these legislative approaches is flawless, they do 
provide a mechanism by which a successful plaintiff could avoid the 
depletion of the value of her recovery that would otherwise occur because 
of the application of the assignment of income doctrine to the contingent 
fee arrangement.  A legislative solution is attractive primarily because it 
provides immediate and consistent implementation without having to 
persuade the judiciary once again to address the context and content of the 
attorney-client relationship in contingent fee cases.  Simplicity and 
predictability are particularly important in the area of taxation and our law 
should reflect those goals.  
C. Policy Implications of Revising the Code to Provide Relief to Plaintiffs 
While advocating in favor of any additions to the Internal Revenue 
Code at this point is perhaps akin to carrying coals to Newcastle, policy 
does in large part support revising the Code to provide relief for plaintiffs 
who have recovered partially taxable and partially non-taxable payments.  
Typical review of tax policy revolves around equity and efficiency 
arguments.  For the equity analysis, one looks at both vertical equity, 
which compares the tax burden of taxpayers of different levels of 
economic well-being, as well as horizontal equity, which compares 
taxpayers of the same level of economic well-being.233  In simple terms, 
vertical equity is an expression of the thought that taxpayers having 
different levels of economic well-being should shoulder different tax 
burdens.234  That is, all other things being the same, an individual with 
$100,000 of income generally should pay more taxes than an individual 
with $25,000 of income.235  On the other hand, horizontal equity is an 
expression of the idea that taxpayers with equal economic well-being 
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should face similar tax burdens.236  Accordingly, two individual taxpayers 
each with $100,000 of income should pay the same amount in taxes, 
everything else being equal.237  Closely related to vertical and horizontal 
equity is the so-called “ability to pay” principle.  The ability to pay 
principle provides that a taxpayer’s tax burden should be related to that 
taxpayer’s level of economic well-being.238  Under this norm, one would 
consider the declining marginal utility of money to determine that an 
additional dollar of tax burden on a wealthy family is less of a sacrifice 
than it would be for a poor family.239    
In conjunction with equity, tax policy is also concerned with the impact 
of changes on the efficiency of the tax system.  In this sense, an efficiency 
analysis looks at whether a particular tax impacts taxpayer decisions in a 
way that makes those decisions different from what they would be absent 
the tax.240  An efficient tax has little or no impact on a taxpayer’s 
decision-making.  The concept of efficiency also touches on the 
complexity of a system.  To the extent tax rules become so complex that 
excessive time and energy are devoted to discerning the application of the 
system to a taxpayer or to enforcing the rules, the tax regime is 
inefficient.241   
Equity, whether couched in vertical or horizontal terms, most strongly 
favors altering or amending the Code to allow plaintiffs with partially 
taxable and partially non-taxable recoveries to exclude or deduct their 
attorneys’ portions of the recovery from their taxable income.242  If a 
major goal of a tax system is to treat similarly-situated taxpayers 
similarly,243 and differently-situated taxpayers differently, then the tax 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Id. at 60; see also Reece, supra note 21, at 335.  
 237. Some have expressed the sentiment that horizontal equity is not a distinct concept 
from vertical equity.  In other words, if the system taxes those with unequal means with 
appropriate distinction, the similar tax treatment of those with equal means naturally follows.  
Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 
TAX L. REV. 319, 362-63 (1993). 
 238. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 233, at 64. 
 239. Id. 
 240. LAURIE L. MALMAN, LINDA F. SUGIN, LEWIS D. SOLOMON, & JEROME M. HESCH, THE 
INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE:  CASES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 9 (2d ed. 
2010). 
 241. See id. at 12.  
 242. See, e.g., Matthew Williams, Comment, The Taxation of Contingent Attorney’s 
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TECH L. REV. 1173 (2005).  
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regime applicable to recovering plaintiffs is a significant policy blemish.  
Litigants are subject to a vast array of tax implications depending upon, 
among many other things, the nature of the cause of action, the timing of 
their recovery, and the structure of the settlement or award.244 
As a matter of social policy and in recognition of the fact that 
physically injured persons receiving compensation will not truly be 
enriched economically by their litigation recoveries, Congress has 
allowed such litigants to exclude personal injury recoveries from their 
gross incomes.245  Other plaintiffs, like those pursuing employment 
discrimination and civil rights claims in the Banks case, will be taxed on 
their recoveries.246  Likewise, a plaintiff receiving a lump-sum immediate 
payment will have different tax consequences from a plaintiff who accepts 
a structured settlement arrangement.247  These distinctions can easily be 
justified because the personal injury litigant or the lump-sum payment 
litigant is in a different economic position than the employment 
discrimination plaintiff and the structured settlement litigant.  A plaintiff 
who must spend much of her recovery on hospital bills and therapy does 
not have the same economic benefit from the recovery as a plaintiff who 
will not necessarily incur those same expenses.  Further, a plaintiff who 
has the immediate use of the entire settlement is in arguably a better 
position economically than one who must receive payments over a period 
of years.248  
                                                                                                                 
 244. See generally Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 154, at 44.  
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Although the original legislative history is scant, it suggests that Congress 
viewed compensation received for personal injuries or sickness as beyond the 
reach of the income tax.  One of the theories supporting the exclusion is that 
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and other damages and costs arising from personal injuries or sickness, 
including lost wages and punitive damages, without paying tax on the recovery. 
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Although disparate tax treatment of claims based on the nature of the 
recovery and timing of the recovery are justifiable, disparate treatment of 
the deductibility of their attorney’s fees and litigation costs is not so easy 
to accept.  Plaintiffs who utilized an attorney under a contingent fee 
arrangement will have to treat the costs of recovering on their claims 
differently based on the underlying cause of action at issue.  It is certain 
in the aftermath of Commissioner v. Banks that all plaintiffs will have to 
include their attorney’s portion of the recovery in the plaintiffs’ income 
even if the contingent attorney’s fee is paid directly to the attorney.249  
However, pursuant to Code § 62(a)(20), added in 2004 in response to 
cases similar to Banks, certain employment discrimination and civil rights 
plaintiffs are allowed to deduct their attorney’s fees above-the-line, giving 
them a break from the harsh tax consequences of the miscellaneous 
itemized deduction characterization and consequent alternative minimum 
tax liability.250  Although the plaintiff in an employment discrimination 
suit will be taxed on the entire award, the above-the-line deduction for 
attorney’s fees paid to recover those taxable amounts could potentially 
place that plaintiff in a better economic position than a personal injury 
plaintiff whose identical total dollar amount recovery consists of a non-
taxable compensatory recovery as well as a sizeable interest 
component.251  To achieve a horizontally equitable system of taxing these 
plaintiffs, a personal injury plaintiff should be allowed to deduct her 
attorney’s fees and litigation costs above-the-line, or exclude the fees and 
costs, from gross income at least to the extent the recovery includes 
taxable interest or punitive damages.  The deduction or exclusion 
advocated in this article would move us closer to a tax system that treats 
similarly situated litigants similarly. 
The potential trade-off from a policy perspective is on the efficiency 
end.  Generally speaking, plaintiffs, whether pursuing a personal injury or 
employment discrimination claim, are likely to retain an attorney pursuant 
to a contingent fee arrangement.  The contingent fee arrangement is so 
ingrained in the culture of plaintiff-side litigation, that it is difficult to 
imagine a situation in which the tax consequences alter a plaintiff’s 
options, much less her choice.252  Further, litigation costs are likely 
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 249. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430. 
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outside of the plaintiff’s control, or at least expertise, in most cases.  In 
this respect, the tax system would not alter a plaintiff’s decision-making, 
and could therefore be considered efficient.253  Nonetheless, it would be 
difficult for one who has railed against the complexity of the Code in both 
practice and the classroom to advocate in favor of additions to the Code 
without at least acknowledging the increased complexity and concomitant 
rule inefficiency such additions bring.  In this case, it is clear that the 
magnitude of the relief provided to plaintiffs outweighs the slight 
additional complexity brought about by providing an above-the-line 
deduction for attorney’s fees and litigation costs incurred by plaintiffs 
with partially taxable and partially non-taxable awards or for an exclusion 
to overcome the assignment of income doctrine applicable to contingent 
fee arrangements.  Further, such additions bring the system closer to 
equity by treating taxpayers who incur similar expenses in recovering on 
their claims with similar deductions or exclusions. 
Conclusion 
Through a series of illustrations, this article is designed to shed some 
light on the dramatic and disproportionate tax consequences that face 
plaintiffs who recover compensatory personal injury damages coupled 
with a taxable interest component.254  In light of this tax burden on a 
successful plaintiff, a burden which amplifies over time as taxable interest 
accrues, it is only equitable to provide such plaintiffs with some measure 
of relief that brings their tax burden closer to that of a plaintiff with a 
wholly taxable employment discrimination or civil rights recovery.255  It is 
becoming increasingly evident in the seven years following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Banks, that the judiciary is unlikely 
to adopt any of the previously proposed solutions to the problem of 
requiring a plaintiff to include her attorney’s portion of her recovery in 
the plaintiff’s gross income pursuant to the anticipatory assignment of 
income doctrine.  Further, many of the non-legislative solutions to this 
dilemma that have been advocated create significant conceptual problems 
or problems in application.256  
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Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code should be amended to provide 
an expanded deduction for the attorney’s fees and litigation costs incurred 
to obtain such an award.257  To be useful, such deduction would have to be 
above-the-line in order to provide a reduction from taxable income that is 
not diminished by the restrictions on miscellaneous itemized deductions 
and would not trigger alternative minimum tax liability.  Alternatively, 
the Code could be revised to allow a plaintiff to exclude from the 
plaintiff’s gross income the attorney’s fee and other litigation costs paid 
under a contingent fee or other arrangement that is delivered directly to 
the attorney and bypasses the plaintiff’s hands altogether.258  Either of 
these legislative approaches would give relief to a successful personal 
injury plaintiff who also receives a taxable interest or punitive damages 
recovery, and bring such a litigant more on par tax-wise with litigants 
who incur attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in pursuing wholly 
taxable recoveries.  Further, compared to judicial approaches, legislative 
solutions have the potential to provide more immediate implementation of 
relief and more consistency in application.  It is no longer prudent to stand 
by and wait for the judiciary to adopt a new approach to viewing the 
contingent fee arrangement in light of Banks’ application of the 
anticipatory assignment-of-income doctrine to such contracts.  Instead, 
consistent with the long-standing policy of making harmed litigants 
whole, real plaintiffs with real injuries need more immediate and 
consistent action to provide relief from an unpalatable tax result.  
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